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The security of quantum key distribution has traditionally been analyzed in either the asymptotic
or non-asymptotic regimes. In this paper, we provide a bridge between these two regimes, by deter-
mining second-order coding rates for key distillation in quantum key distribution under collective
attacks. Our main result is a formula that characterizes the backoff from the known asymptotic
formula for key distillation—our formula incorporates the reliability and security of the protocol, as
well as the mutual information variances to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In order to
determine secure key rates against collective attacks, one should perform a joint optimization of the
Holevo information and the Holevo information variance to the eavesdropper. We show how to do
so by analyzing several examples, including the six-state, BB84, and continuous-variable quantum
key distribution protocols (the last involving Gaussian modulation of coherent states along with
heterodyne detection). The technical contributions of this paper include one-shot and second-order
analyses of private communication over a compound quantum wiretap channel with fixed marginal
and key distillation over a compound quantum wiretap source with fixed marginal. We also estab-
lish the second-order asymptotics of the smooth max-relative entropy of quantum states acting on a
separable Hilbert space, and we derive a formula for the Holevo information variance of a Gaussian
ensemble of Gaussian states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the near-term applications of quantum in-
formation science is quantum key distribution (QKD)
[BB84, Eke91]. By making use of an insecure quantum
channel and a public, authenticated classical channel, two
parties can share an information-theoretically secure se-
cret key, which can be used later on for one-time pad en-
cryption of a private message. There has been significant
progress on this topic in the decades since it was con-
ceived [SBPC+09, Lu¨t14, LCT14, DLQY16, XMZ+19].
A critical challenge for this research area is to estab-
lish security proofs for quantum key distribution. In
particular, we are interested in determining the maxi-
mum possible rates that are achievable in principle and
guaranteed to be secure against any possible eavesdrop-
per allowed by quantum mechanics. Security proofs
have been developed for discrete-variable quantum key
distribution (DV-QKD) protocols, both in the asymp-
totic [LC99, SP00, May01, RGK05, Koa06] and non-
asymptotic regimes [Ren05, TLGR12, HT12, TL17].
There are also advanced numerical approaches for ad-
dressing the asymptotic security of DV-QKD protocols
[CML16, WLC18]. Additionally, security proofs have
been developed for continuous-variable quantum key dis-
tribution (CV-QKD) protocols [GG02a, GG02b], in the
asymptotic [NGA06, GPC06, RC09] and non-asymptotic
regimes [FFB+12, Fur14, Lev17]. Furthermore, security
proofs have appeared for asymptotic security of discrete-
modulation protocols for CV-QKD [ZHRL09, BW18,
KGW19, GGDL19, LUL19].
In this work, we address the security of quantum key
distribution in a regime that represents a bridge between
the asymptotic and non-asymptotic regimes. Namely,
we employ the methods of second-order asymptotics
[Li14, TH13] in order to determine secure key rates for
the key distillation step of a quantum key distribution
protocol, under the assumption that an adversary applies
a collective attack. Our development here covers both
DV-QKD and CV-QKD protocols, due to various tech-
nical advances that we make in this paper. Second-order
quantum information theory grew out of earlier devel-
opments in classical information theory [Hay09, PPV10],
and it has since been explored extensively for various
quantum communication tasks [TT15b, DL15, DTW16,
WRG16, TBR16, WTB17, Wil17a, OMW19]. The goal
of a second-order information-theoretic analysis is to de-
termine the extra backoff from or overhead on the rates
that are achievable in the asymptotic case, which are
due to finite-size effects. In the context of quantum key
distribution, the approach has been used for analyzing
information reconciliation [TMMPE17], for proving up-
per bounds on secure key rates [WTB17, KW17], and
to address the entropy accumulation problem in device-
independent QKD [DF19].
One contribution of our paper is that it is possible to
evaluate distillable key rates in a regime that goes beyond
a first-order asymptotic analysis, which is the typical case
studied in several of the aforementioned works [LC99,
SP00, May01, Koa06, CML16, WLC18, NGA06, GPC06,
RC09, ZHRL09, BW18, KGW19, GGDL19, LUL19]. It
has been found in several preceding information-theoretic
contributions that a second-order analysis gives excellent
agreement with what is actually achievable in the finite-
size regime [Hay09, PPV10, TBR16, WTB17]. Thus, it
is expected that our second-order analysis should agree
well with secure distillable key rates that are achievable
in principle in the finite-size regime.
To summarize our main contribution to QKD security
analysis, suppose that S is an “uncertainty set” indexing
the states of the eavesdropper Eve that are consistent
with the observed measurement results of the sender Al-
ice and the receiver Bob. Let pXY (x, y) be the proba-
bility distribution estimated by Alice and Bob after the
parameter estimation step of a QKD protocol [NB]. For
fixed s ∈ S, let {pXY (x, y), ρx,y,sE }x,y,s be an ensemble of
states that is consistent with the measurement results of
Alice and Bob. Here we are assuming that Eve employs
a collective attack, meaning that she applies the same
quantum channel to every transmission of Alice. Then
our contribution is that the following is the rate at which
secret key bits can be generated in the key distillation
step of a direct reconciliation protocol, for sufficiently
large n, such that Bob’s decoding error probability is no
larger than εI ∈ (0, 1) and the security parameter of the
key is no larger than εII ∈ (0, 1):
I(X;Y ) +
√
1
n
V (X;Y )Φ−1(εI)
− sup
s∈S
[
I(X;E)s −
√
1
n
V (X;E)sΦ
−1(εII)
]
3+O
(
log n
n
)
, (1)
where
Φ−1(ε) := sup {a ∈ R | Φ(a) ≤ ε} , (2)
Φ(a) :=
1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
dx exp
(−x2
2
)
. (3)
In the above, I(X;Y ) is the Alice–Bob mutual informa-
tion, V (X;Y ) is the Alice–Bob mutual information vari-
ance, I(X;E)s is the Alice–Eve Holevo information for
fixed s, and V (X;E)s is the Alice–Eve Holevo informa-
tion variance for fixed s. The first-order term is given by
I(X;Y ) − sups∈S I(X;E)s, which is the standard infor-
mation quantity considered in asymptotic security anal-
yses (see, e.g., [Lu¨t14]). In such a first-order asymptotic
analysis, the quantity I(X;Y )− sups∈S I(X;E)s is typi-
cally understood as the asymptotic rate at which an im-
perfect ensemble can be converted to a perfectly secure
key. However, this conversion is only perfect in a precise
sense in the asymptotic limit. What the mutual informa-
tion variance V (X;Y ) and the Holevo information vari-
ance V (X;E)s characterize are the fluctuations about
the first-order terms, which are due to finite-size effects,
much like the variance of a random variable characterizes
the speed of convergence toward the mean in the central-
limit theorem [KS10, She11]. The second-order terms√
1
nV (X;Y )Φ
−1(εI) and
√
1
nV (X;E)sΦ
−1(εII) are neg-
ative for εI, εII < 1/2, and thus they characterize the
back-off from the asymptotic limit for sufficiently large,
yet finite n. In Section II A 4, we define all of these in-
formation quantities formally and explain them in more
detail.
For the key distillation step of a reverse reconciliation
protocol, the key rate is given by
I(X;Y ) +
√
1
n
V (X;Y )Φ−1(εI)
− sup
s∈S
[
I(Y ;E)s −
√
1
n
V (Y ;E)sΦ
−1(εII)
]
+O
(
log n
n
)
. (4)
The information quantities appearing in the above for-
mula and their interpretations are essentially the same as
those given in (1), with the difference being the substi-
tutions I(X;E)s → I(Y ;E)s and V (X;E)s → V (Y ;E)s
to account for reverse reconciliation.
The formulas in (1) and (4) apply regardless of whether
the variables X and Y are continuous or discrete, and
whether the system E is finite- or infinite-dimensional.
It is thus an advantage of our results that the expres-
sions are given in terms of mutual informations and
their variances rather than conditional entropies and
their variances, as the former ones are well defined
for infinite-dimensional systems (see the discussion in
[LGG10, Section IV-B]). Furthermore, the above for-
mulas apply whenever n is large enough so that n ∼
max{ε−2I , ε−2II }. However, as we stated above, in prior
work, this kind of second-order approximation has given
excellent agreement with actual finite-size achievability
statements [Hay09, PPV10, TBR16, WTB17].
When performing the optimization given by
sup
s∈S
[
I(Y ;E)s −
√
1
n
V (Y ;E)sΦ
−1(εII)
]
, (5)
it is possible for large enough n to employ a pertur-
bative approach, in which the first-order term I(Y ;E)s
is optimized first, and then among all of the ensembles
achieving the optimum first-order term, one further op-
timizes the second-order term −
√
1
nV (Y ;E)sΦ
−1(εII).
See [PPV10, Lemmas 63 and 64] for a justification of
this approach.
In Section II, we evaluate achievable secure key rates
for three standard QKD protocols: the six-state DV-QKD
protocol [Bru98, BPG99], the BB84 DV-QKD protocol
[BB84], and the CV-QKD protocol involving Gaussian-
modulation coherent-state encodings along with hetero-
dyne detection [GG02a, GG02b]. We find various ana-
lytical expressions for the achievable second-order coding
rates, and we plot their performance in order to have a
sense of what rates are achievable in principle.
We remark here that the contribution of our paper
goes beyond the setting of quantum key distribution and
applies more broadly in the context of private communi-
cation in quantum information theory. A starting point
for our development is [Wil17a], but here our result ap-
plies more broadly to the scenario in which the Alice–
Eve correlations are not precisely known but instead cho-
sen from an “uncertainty set.” Furthermore, our results
apply to the scenario in which the underlying quantum
states act on an infinite-dimensional, separable Hilbert
space (see [HZ12] for a review of this setting of quan-
tum information theory). See Sections III and IV for a
one-shot analysis and Section V for a second-order anal-
ysis. The information-theoretic setting that we consider
here (secure communication against collective attacks) is
strongly related to universal private communication and
secret key distillation [DH10], as well as the compound
wiretap channel and compound wiretap source settings
[CCD12, BCCD14, BJ16]. We note here that the com-
pound wiretap setting has been of considerable interest
in classical information theory recently [SBP15].
As a side note, it is unclear to us from reading the
literature whether researchers working on security anal-
yses against collective attacks in QKD and those work-
ing on universal and compound information-theoretic se-
crecy questions are fully aware of each other, and so one
byproduct of our work could be to develop more inter-
action between these communities. Related to this, the
QKD security proof community has been consistently ap-
plying the Devetak–Winter formula [DW05] to analyze
secret key rates for collective attacks in QKD, in spite of
4the fact that the Devetak–Winter protocol from [DW05]
does not generally apply to such a scenario and instead
only applies to a known, fixed attack. The results of our
paper also clarify and bridge this gap, and we discuss all
of these points in more detail in Section VI.
On a technical level, an important contribution of our
paper is to determine the second-order asymptotics of the
smooth max-relative entropy (see Appendix F), and this
is the main reason why our security analysis applies to
the infinite-dimensional case. This result also has impli-
cations for the distinguishability dilution task in the re-
source theory of asymmetric distinguishability [WW19].
We also extend some other known relations from the
finite- to infinite-dimensional case (see Appendices B, C,
D, and E). Combined with the second-order asymptotics
of the hypothesis testing relative entropy for the infinite-
dimensional case [DPR16, KW17, OMW19], we are then
led to our claim concerning second-order coding rates for
private communication, secret key distillation, and key
distillation in quantum key distribution.
Another technical contribution of our paper is a for-
mula for the Holevo information variance of a Gaussian
ensemble of quantum Gaussian states (see Proposition 2
in Appendix H). This formula is useful in a second-order
analysis of CV-QKD protocols, and we expect it to be
useful in other contexts besides those considered here.
We also derive a novel expression for the Holevo informa-
tion of a Gaussian ensemble of quantum Gaussian states
(see Proposition 2).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first con-
sider the second-order analysis of the key distillation step
of quantum key distribution in Section II, and therein we
analyze the approach for the important examples men-
tioned above (six state, BB84, CV-QKD). After that, we
then develop the information-theoretic compound wire-
tap settings and protocols and the corresponding secure
rates in detail. In Section VI, we provide a historical
discussion of the compound wiretap setting and collec-
tive attacks in quantum key distribution, with the stated
goal of bridging the communities working on these re-
lated topics. We finally conclude in Section VIII with a
summary and a list of open questions. The appendices
provide details of various technical contributions that are
useful for this work and might be of independent interest.
II. SECOND-ORDER CODING RATES FOR
KEY DISTILLATION IN QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
We begin by presenting one of our main results, which
is the application of the second-order coding rates in (1)
and (4) to the key distillation step of a quantum key dis-
tribution protocol. The claim here rests upon the one-
shot information-theoretic key distillation protocol from
Section IV and its second-order expansion in Section V,
the details of which are presented in these later sections.
Here we first review a generic prepare-and-measure QKD
protocol and then state how (1) and (4) apply in this
context. We finally analyze the approach in the con-
text of the six-state DV-QKD protocol [Bru98, BPG99],
the BB84 DV-QKD protocol [BB84], and the reverse-
reconciliation CV-QKD protocol [GG02b]. All source
code files needed to generate the plots in this section
are available as ancillary files with the arXiv posting of
this paper.
We should clarify that our main emphasis, as indicated
above, is on the key distillation step of a quantum key
distribution protocol and how to incorporate a second-
order coding rate analysis. As part of this, we are as-
suming that the parameter estimation step of a QKD
protocol yields reliable estimates of the classical channel
from Alice to Bob that is induced by the quantum phase
of the QKD protocol. We expand more upon this point
in what follows, and we note up front here that it is an
open question to incorporate a full second-order analysis
that includes the parameter estimation step in addition
to the key distillation step.
A. Generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocol
Let us recall the structure of a generic prepare-and-
measure protocol for quantum key distribution, in which
the adversary applies a collective attack. The protocol
consists of three steps: a quantum phase, parameter esti-
mation, and key distillation (the last combines informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy amplification into a single
step). We consider both direct and reverse reconciliation
settings for key distillation.
1. Quantum phase
The quantum phase of the protocol consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. It begins with the sender Alice picking a state ρxA
randomly from an ensemble
EA := {pX(x), ρxA}x∈X , (6)
where pX is a probability distribution and each
state ρxA is described by a density operator acting
on an input Hilbert space HA.
2. Alice transmits the system A through an unknown
quantum channel NA→B , with input system A and
output system B. It is assumed that the channel
itself is controlled by the eavesdropper Eve, and the
output system B is given to the legitimate receiver
Bob. It is a standard feature of quantum infor-
mation that every quantum channel has an isomet-
ric extension [Sti55] (see also, e.g., [Wil17b]), from
which the original channel can be realized by a par-
tial trace over an environment system. Thus, there
5exists an isometric channel UNA→BE extending the
channel NA→B such that
NA→B = TrE ◦UNA→BE . (7)
In the worst-case scenario, the eavesdropper has
full access to the environment system E, and so
we assume that she does (as is standard in QKD
security proof analyses).
3. Upon receiving the system B, the receiver Bob
performs a measurement channel MB→Y , which
is uniquely specified by a positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) {ΛyB}y∈Y , such that
ΛyB ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ Y,
∑
y∈Y
ΛyB = IB . (8)
According to the Born rule, the measurement chan-
nel MB→Y gives the outcome y with probability
Tr[ΛyBωB ] if the input state is ωB .
One round of this protocol leads to the following en-
semble:
EQKD := EQKD(EA,UNA→BE ,MB→Y ) (9)
:= {pXY (x, y), ρx,yE }x∈X ,y∈Y , (10)
where the joint distribution pXY (x, y) is given as
pXY (x, y) = pX(x)pY |X(y|x), (11)
pY |X(y|x) := Tr[ΛyBNA→B(ρxA)], (12)
and the eavesdropper states ρx,yE are as follows:
ρx,yE :=
TrB [Λ
y
BUNA→BE(ρxA)]
pY |X(y|x) . (13)
Observe how the protocol induces a classical channel
pY |X(y|x) from Alice to Bob via the Born rule in (12).
The above steps are repeated m = k + n times, where
k is the number of rounds used for parameter estimation
and n is the number of rounds used for key distillation.
The ensemble shared between Alice, Bob, and Eve after
these m rounds is as follows:
E⊗mQKD := E⊗mQKD(E⊗mA , (UNA→BE)⊗m, (MB→Y )⊗m) (14)
:=
{
pXmYm(x
m, ym), ρx
m,ym
Em
}
xm∈Xm,ym∈Ym
,
(15)
where
pXmYm(x
m, ym) :=
m∏
i=1
pXiYi(xi, yi), (16)
ρx
m,ym
Em := ρ
x1,y1
E1
⊗ · · · ⊗ ρxm,ymEm , (17)
ρxi,yiEi :=
TrBi [Λ
yi
Bi
UNAi→BiEi(ρxiAi)]
pYi|Xi(yi|xi)
, (18)
pYi|Xi(yi|xi) := Tr[ΛyiBiNAi→Bi(ρxiAi)]. (19)
A critical assumption that we make in the above is that
Eve employs a collective attack, meaning that the isomet-
ric channel she applies over the m rounds is the tensor-
power channel (UNA→BE)⊗m.
a. Channel twirling In order to simplify or sym-
metrize the collective attacks that need to be considered,
Alice and Bob can employ an additional symmetrization
of the protocol in each round, called channel twirling,
introduced in a different context in [BDSW96]. Let
{UgA}g∈G and {V gB}g∈G be unitary representations of a
group G, such that the unitaries act on the input Hilbert
space HA and output Hilbert space HB , respectively.
Then before sending out her state ρxA, Alice can select
g uniformly at random from the group G, apply the uni-
tary UgA to her state, communicate the value of g over a
public classical communication channel to Bob, who then
performs V g†B on his system before acting with his mea-
surement. If Alice and Bob then discard the value of g,
this twirling procedure transforms the original quantum
channel NA→B to the following symmetrized quantum
channel:
NA→B(ωA) := 1|G|
∑
g∈G
(Vg†A ◦ NA→B ◦ UgA)(ωA), (20)
where
UgA(·) := UgA(·)Ug†A , VgB(·) := V gB(·)V g†B . (21)
Although channel twirling produces a worse (noisier)
channel from the original one, the main benefit is that
the number of parameters that are needed to specify
NA→B can be far fewer than the number needed to spec-
ify NA→B . For example, if the original channel NA→B is
a qubit channel and the unitaries consist of the Pauli op-
erators, then the resulting twirled channel is a Pauli chan-
nel and thus specified by only three parameters. If the
original channel NA→B is a single-mode bosonic channel
and the unitaries consist of the four equally spaced phase
rotations {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}, then the resulting channel is
a phase covariant (phase insensitive) channel [KGW19]
and has fewer parameters that characterize it.
b. Finite-dimensional assumptions In the trusted
device scenario that we are dealing with here, if the
Hilbert space HA is finite dimensional, then we are mak-
ing an implicit assumption that the union of the supports
of the states ρxA are fully contained in the Hilbert space
HA and there is no leakage outside of it. In the case that
system B is finite dimensional (i.e., the Hilbert space HB
is finite dimensional), then we are making an implicit as-
sumption that the measurement operators {ΛyB}y∈Y sat-
isfy
∑
y∈Y Λ
y
B = IB and that IB is indeed the identity
operator for HB . Thus, if both the input and output
Hilbert spaces HA and HB are finite dimensional, then
by the Choi–Kraus theorem (see, e.g., [Wil17b]), it is
not necessary for Eve’s system to be any larger than
dim(HA) · dim(HB). So it follows that the finite di-
mensional assumption leads to strong constraints about
Eve’s attack, which may not necessarily hold in practice
and thus should be stated up front. This is especially
the case when dealing with photonic states and mea-
surements acting on subspaces of an infinite-dimensional
bosonic Fock space.
62. Sifting
Some QKD protocols, such as the six-state and BB84
protocols, incorporate a sifting step, in which a fraction
of the data generated by the protocol is discarded. The
main reason for incorporating sifting is that some input-
output pairs in X ×Y do not give any useful information
about the channel (Eve’s attack) and thus can be dis-
carded. For example, if the input state is |0〉〈0| or |1〉〈1|
and Bob measures in the basis {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}, then
even in the noiseless case of no eavesdropping, the out-
come of the measurement is independent of the input and
thus yields no useful information.
This sifting step can be described mathematically as a
filter onto a subset F ⊆ X × Y, with the sifting proba-
bility given by
psift :=
∑
(x,y)∈F
pXY (x, y), (22)
and the conditioned ensemble by
EsiftQKD := {p′XY (x, y), ρx,yE }(x,y)∈F , (23)
where
p′XY (x, y) := pXY (x, y)/psift. (24)
As a consequence of sifting, some number m′ of the orig-
inal m rounds are selected, and the remaining systems of
Alice, Bob, and Eve are described by the tensor-power
ensemble:
(EsiftQKD)⊗m
′
:={
p′
Xm′Ym′ (x
m′ , ym
′
), ρx
m′ ,ym
′
Em′
}
(xm′ ,ym′ )∈Fm′
, (25)
with the above quantities defined similarly as in (14)–
(19).
In the discussion that follows in Section II A 3, we sim-
ply relabel m′ as m and the distribution p′XY (x, y) as
pXY (x, y), with it understood that elements of pXY (x, y)
with (x, y) outside of F are set to zero. The distribution
pX is the marginal of pXY , and the conditional distribu-
tion pY |X is a classical channel computed from pXY as
usual via pXY (x, y)/pX(x).
3. Parameter estimation
After m rounds of the protocol are complete, k of the
XY classical systems are randomly selected by Alice and
Bob for parameter estimation, in order to estimate the
set S of possible collective attacks of Eve. To be clear, the
classical systems used for parameter estimation are Xi1 ,
Yi1 , . . . , Xik , Yik for some randomly selected (without
replacement) i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In what follows, we assume that k is large enough such
that Alice and Bob get a very reliable (essentially ex-
act) estimate of the classical channel pY |X(y|x). This as-
sumption is strong, but as stated above, our main focus
in this paper is on analyzing second-order coding rates in
the key distillation step of the quantum key distribution
protocol. In Section II C, we discuss various routes for
addressing this problem.
The goal of the parameter estimation step is to esti-
mate the classical channel pY |X(y|x) reliably in order to
produce an estimate of the unknown quantum channel
NA→B connecting Alice and Bob. Doing so then allows
them to estimate the isometric channel UNA→BE , up to
an information theoretically irrelevant isometry acting
on the system E. In more detail, note that any other
isometric extension of the original channel NA→B is re-
lated to UNA→BE by an isometric channel acting on the
system E. That is, suppose that VNA→BE′ is another
isometric channel satisfying NA→B = TrE′ ◦VNA→BE′ .
Then there exists an isometric channelWE→E′ such that
VNA→BE′ = WE→E′ ◦ UNA→BE [Wil17b]. However, Eve’s
information about the classical systems X and Y is the
same regardless of which particular isometric extension
is considered. Thus, as stated above, the goal of the pa-
rameter estimation step is to estimate the channel NA→B
by employing the estimate of pY |X(y|x).
As a result of the parameter estimation step, Alice and
Bob determine an uncertainty set S, each element s of
which indexes a quantum channel N sA→B that is consis-
tent with the classical channel pY |X(y|x), in the sense
that
pY |X(y|x) = Tr[ΛyBN sA→B(ρxA)], (26)
for all s ∈ S, x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y. It is generally not pos-
sible to determine the actual quantum channel NA→B
exactly, so that |S| > 1. However, if the input ensem-
ble EA = {pX(x), ρxA}x∈X and the POVM {ΛyB}y∈Y form
a tomographically complete set [CN97, PCZ97], then it
is possible to determine an exact estimate of the ac-
tual, unknown quantum channel NA→B from the clas-
sical channel pY |X(y|x). That is, in the tomographically
complete case, there exists an invertible linear map relat-
ing pY |X(y|x) and NA→B . So in this special case, there is
a unique quantum channel NA→B corresponding to the
classical channel pY |X(y|x).
In some parameter estimation protocols, Alice and Bob
do not estimate the entries of pY |X(y|x) for all x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y, but they instead do so for a subset of X × Y
(for example as a consequence of sifting). Furthermore,
they could reduce the number of parameters that need
to be estimated by employing additional symmetrization
of pY |X(y|x), in which some of the entries are averaged
or simple functions of them are computed. These latter
approaches are commonly employed in the parameter es-
timation phase of the BB84 and six-state protocols, in
which quantum bit error rates (QBERs) are estimated
in lieu of all entries of pY |X(y|x). Another example
for which the full pY |X(y|x) is not typically estimated
7is CV-QKD, where only two scalar parameters are esti-
mated in order to derive a key-rate lower bound under a
collective-attack assumption, even in a finite key-length
regime [Lev15].
4. Key distillation
After the parameter estimation step, the ensemble
characterizing each of the n remaining systems shared
by Alice, Bob, and Eve is as follows:
EsQKD := {pXY (x, y), ρx,y,sE }x∈X ,y∈Y,s∈S , (27)
where
pXY (x, y) = pX(x)pY |X(y|x), (28)
pY |X(y|x) := Tr[ΛyBN sA→B(ρxA)], (29)
and the eavesdropper states ρx,y,sE are as follows:
ρx,y,sE :=
TrB [Λ
y
BUN
s
A→BE(ρ
x
A)]
pY |X(y|x) . (30)
The full ensemble for the n remaining systems is an n-
fold tensor power of the above, similar to that given
in (14)–(19), except with the substitutions m → n and
N → N s. Note that the classical channel pY |X(y|x) is
known and independent of s, due to our assumption of a
collective attack and that k is large enough so that Alice
and Bob can estimate pY |X(y|x) reliably. That is, there
could be many quantum channels N sA→B that lead to
the same classical channel pY |X(y|x) if the input prepa-
ration and the output measurements are not tomograph-
ically complete. Furthermore, the distribution pX(x) is
known because Alice controls the random selection of the
states {ρxA}x∈X .
The ensemble in (27) is then a particular instance
of the information-theoretic model presented later on
in Section IV. Specifically, the ensemble in (27) is an
instance of the compound wiretap source with fixed
marginal from (210), in which the system B in (210) is in
correspondence with the classical system Y in (27). As a
result, we can apply (248) (itself a consequence of The-
orem 5) to conclude that the following rate is achievable
for key distillation for the remaining n rounds, by using
direct reconciliation:
I(X;Y )Es +
√
1
n
V (X;Y )EsΦ−1(εI)
− sup
s∈S
[
I(X;E)Es −
√
1
n
V (X;E)EsΦ−1(εII)
]
+O
(
log n
n
)
, (31)
for sufficiently large n and with decoding error probabil-
ity not larger than εI and security parameter not larger
than εII (these latter two quantities are defined in Sec-
tion IV A). In the above, the first two terms depend on
the probability distribution pXY in (27), but they have
no dependence on s. The inverse cumulative Gaussian
distribution function Φ−1(·) is defined in (2). The clas-
sical mutual information is defined as
I(X;Y )Es :=
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
pXY (x, y) log2
(
pXY (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
)
,
(32)
the classical mutual information variance as [Str62,
Hay09, PPV10]
V (X;Y )Es :=∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
pXY (x, y)
[
log2
(
pXY (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
)
− I(X;Y )Es
]2
,
(33)
the Holevo information as [Hol73]
I(X;E)Es :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)D(ρ
x,s
E ‖ρsE), (34)
and the Holevo information variance as
V (X;E)Es :=∑
x∈X
pX(x)
[
V (ρx,sE ‖ρsE) + [D(ρx,sE ‖ρsE)]2
]
−[I(X;E)Es ]2 ,
(35)
where
ρx,sE :=
∑
y∈Y
pY |X(y|x)ρx,y,sE , (36)
ρsE :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)ρ
x,s
E . (37)
The quantum relative entropy of states ω and τ is defined
as [Ume62]
D(ω‖τ) := Tr[ω (log2 ω − log2 τ)], (38)
and the quantum relative entropy variance as [Li14,
TH13]
V (ω‖τ) := Tr[ω (log2 ω − log2 τ −D(ω‖τ))2]. (39)
These quantities are defined more generally in (245)–
(246) for states acting on separable Hilbert spaces. If
either alphabet X or Y is continuous, then the corre-
sponding sum is replaced with an integral.
If Alice and Bob employ reverse reconciliation instead
for key distillation, then the following distillable key rate
is achievable:
I(X;Y )Es +
√
1
n
V (X;Y )EsΦ−1(εI)
8− sup
s∈S
[
I(Y ;E)Es −
√
1
n
V (Y ;E)EsΦ−1(εII)
]
+O
(
log n
n
)
, (40)
with the Holevo information defined as
I(Y ;E)Es :=
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)D(ρ
y,s
E ‖ρsE), (41)
and the Holevo information variance as
V (Y ;E)Es :=∑
y∈Y
pY (y)
[
V (ρy,sE ‖ρsE) + [D(ρy,sE ‖ρsE)]2
]
−[I(Y ;E)Es ]2 ,
(42)
where
ρy,sE :=
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)ρx,y,sE . (43)
a. On reconciliation efficiency and privacy amplifica-
tion overhead It is common in the key distillation step of
a first-order asymptotic analysis to incorporate a recon-
ciliation efficiency parameter β ∈ [0, 1], which recognizes
the fact that it is never possible in any realistic scheme
to achieve the Shannon limit I(X;Y )Es . That is, the
information reconciliation rate is written as βI(X;Y )Es .
Typically, the reconciliation efficiency β is chosen as a
constant independent of the channel, the blocklength n,
and the decoding error probability εI. As argued in
[TMMPE17], this approximation is rather rough, and
one can instead employ a second-order analysis to get
a much better approximation of the reconciliation effi-
ciency. What we find from (31) and (40) is that the ideal
reconciliation efficiency is characterized in terms of pXY ,
n, and εI as follows:
β(pXY , n, εI) := 1 +
√
1
nV (X;Y )EsΦ
−1(εI)
I(X;Y )Es
, (44)
so that
β(pXY , n, εI)I(X;Y )Es
= I(X;Y )Es +
√
1
n
V (X;Y )EsΦ−1(εI). (45)
(Keep in mind that Φ−1(εI) < 0 for εI < 1/2.) One
can also find very good fits of the information reconcili-
ation performance for actual codes by allowing for con-
stants β1 and β2, each not necessarily equal to one, to
characterize the reconciliation efficiency empirically as
follows [TMMPE17]:
β(pXY , n, εI, β1, β2) := β1 + β2
√
1
nV (X;Y )EsΦ
−1(εI)
I(X;Y )Es
.
(46)
Thus, the formula above is a more useful guideline for
reconciliation efficiency.
What we also notice in (31) and (40) is the pres-
ence of terms related to privacy amplification over-
head. Privacy amplification overhead beyond the term
sups∈S I(Y ;E)Es is not typically taken into account
in first-order asymptotic security analyses, in spite of
the fact that other factors are inevitably necessary.
To be clear, the privacy amplification overhead is a
factor γ > 1 that multiplies the asymptotic, first-
order term sups∈S I(Y ;E)Es . By employing [PPV10,
Lemma 63], the following expansion in n holds for
direct-reconciliation privacy amplification for sufficiently
large n:
sup
s∈S
[I(X;E)Es ]−
√
1
n
V (X,S∗)Φ−1(εII) + o(1/
√
n),
(47)
where
V (X,S∗) :=
{
sups∈S∗ V (X;E)Es if εII ≤ 12
infs∈S∗ V (X;E)Es else
, (48)
S∗ := arg max
s∈S
I(X;E)Es . (49)
In the above, we are applying the perturbative approach
of [PPV10, Lemma 63], in which we optimize the first-
order term I(X;E)Es , and then among all of the op-
timizers of this first-order term, we are optimizing the
second-order term V (X;E)Es . Thus, the ideal privacy
amplification overhead is given by
γ(S, n, εII) := 1−
√
1
nV (X,S∗)Φ−1(εII)
sups∈S [I(X;E)Es ]
, (50)
so that
γ(S, n, εII) sup
s∈S
[I(X;E)Es ] =
sup
s∈S
[I(X;E)Es ]−
√
1
n
V (X,S∗)Φ−1(εII). (51)
As above, we could also allow for a more refined expres-
sion as follows, in terms of constants γ1 and γ2, in order
to fit the performance of realistic privacy amplification
protocols:
γ(S, n, εII, γ1, γ2) := γ1−γ2
√
1
nV (X,S∗)Φ−1(εII)
sups∈S [I(X;E)Es ]
. (52)
B. Examples
1. General setup for the six-state and BB84 DV-QKD
protocols
We begin this example section by providing the general
setup for both the ideal, trusted six-state [Bru98, BPG99]
9and BB84 [BB84] DV-QKD protocols, which are particu-
lar instances of the generic prepare-and-measure protocol
presented in Section II A.
In both of these protocols, the random variable X for
Alice’s encoding is a joint random variable consisting of
random variables X1 and X2, where X1 represents Alice’s
basis choice, and X2 is the binary random variable corre-
sponding to the state taken from the chosen basis. The
random variables X1 and X2 are independent. We simi-
larly have that the output random variable Y for Bob is
a joint random variable consisting of random variables Y1
and Y2, where Y1 represents the choice of measurement
basis, and Y2 represents the outcome of the measurement.
Let the alphabet B contain the possible basis choices.
The random variablesX1 and Y1 take values in B. For the
six-state protocol, Bsix-state = {0, 1, 2}, with “0” denoting
the X-basis, “1” the Z-basis, and “2” the Y -basis. For
the BB84 protocol, BBB84 = {0, 1}. Then, let qAb and
qBb be the probabilities that Alice and Bob, respectively,
choose the basis b ∈ B. In other words,
qAb := Pr[X1 = b], q
B
b := Pr[Y1 = b]. (53)
Let us define the following:
Π00 := |+〉〈+| ≡ ρ0,0A , (54)
Π01 := |−〉〈−| ≡ ρ0,1A , (55)
Π10 := |0〉〈0| ≡ ρ1,0A , (56)
Π11 := |1〉〈1| ≡ ρ1,1A , (57)
Π20 := |+i〉〈+i| ≡ ρ2,0A , (58)
Π21 := |−i〉〈−i| ≡ ρ2,1A , (59)
where
|+〉 := (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2, (60)
|−〉 := (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2, (61)
|+i〉 := (|0〉+ i|1〉)/
√
2, (62)
|−i〉 := (|0〉 − i|1〉)/
√
2, (63)
Now, Alice chooses the basis bA ∈ B with probability
qAbA , and with probability
1
2 chooses one of the two states
{ρbA,0A , ρbA,1A } in the basis to send to Bob. These choices
are independent, and so we have that
pX1X2(bA, x) = q
A
bA ·
1
2
. (64)
The encoding ensemble EA is thus
EA := {pX1X2(bA, x), ρbA,xA }bA∈B,x∈{0,1}. (65)
The decoding POVM for Bob is{
qBbBΠ
bB
y
}
bB∈B,y∈{0,1} , (66)
which is equivalent to Bob picking the basis bB at ran-
dom according to qBbB and then performing the measure-
ment {ΠbB0 ,ΠbB1 }.
The protocol is finite dimensional, meaning that the
assumptions stated in Section II A 1 b, come into play.
Thus, the attack NA→B that Eve applies is a qubit chan-
nel.
The channel twirling that Alice and Bob perform in
this case is a Pauli channel twirl [BDSW96]. That is,
before sending out her state, Alice applies, uniformly
at random, one of the Pauli operators I, X, Y , or Z
and Bob applies the corresponding Pauli after receiving
the state from the channel. Thus, both {UgA}g∈G and{V gB}g∈G , as discussed in Section II A 1 a, are the Pauli
group {I,X, Y, Z}. Then the resulting twirled channel is
as given in (20), and it is well known that a Pauli twirl
of a qubit channel leads to a Pauli channel [DHCB05]:
NA→B(ωA) = pIωA + pXXωAX + pY Y ωAY + pZZωAZ,
(67)
where pI , pX , pY , pZ ≥ 0 and pI + pX + pY + pZ = 1.
Note that it is not necessary for Alice and Bob to apply
the Pauli channel twirl in an active way in the quantum
domain. Since the encoding ensemble in (65) is invariant
with respect to the Pauli group (for both the six-state
and BB84 protocols), Alice can keep track of the twirl
in classical processing. Similarly, the decoding POVM of
Bob in (66) is invariant with respect to the Pauli group,
so that Bob can keep track of the twirl in classical pro-
cessing.
At the end of the quantum phase of the protocol, the
induced classical channel is as follows
pY1Y2|X1X2(bB , y|bA, x) = qBbB Tr[ΠbBy NA→B(ρbA,xA )].
(68)
The joint probability distribution shared by Alice and
Bob is then as follows:
pX1X2Y1Y2(bA, x, bB , y)
= pY1Y2|X1X2(bB , y|bA, x)pX1X2(bA, x) (69)
=
1
2
qAbAq
B
bB Tr[Π
bB
y NA→B(ρbA,xA )]. (70)
Both the six-state and BB84 protocols involve a sifting
step, as discussed in Section II A 2. Only the data are
kept for which the sender and receiver’s basis bits agree.
The probability that Alice and Bob choose the same basis
is given by
psift :=
∑
b∈B
qAb q
B
b (71)
The resulting probability distribution shared by Alice
and Bob is
psiftX1X2Y1Y2(b, x, b, y) :=
qAb q
B
b
2psift
Tr[ΠbyNA→B(ρb,xA )], (72)
and it is for this (conditional) probability distribution
that parameter estimation occurs and using which key
distillation occurs in both the six-state and BB84 proto-
cols.
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The full classical-classical-quantum state of Alice, Bob,
and the eavesdropper, can be written via an isometric
extension UNA→BE of the channel NA→B . Specifically,
ρsiftX1X2Y1Y2E =∑
b∈B
1∑
x,y=0
qAb q
B
b
psift
pX2Y2|X1Y1(x, y|b, b) |b, b〉〈b, b|X1Y1
⊗ |x, y〉〈x, y|X2Y2 ⊗ ρb,x,yE , (73)
where
pX2Y2|X1Y1(x, y|b, b) =
1
2
Tr[ΠbyNA→B(ρb,xA )], (74)
ρb,x,yE =
TrB [Π
b
yUNA→BE(ρb,xA )]
pX2Y2|X1Y1(x, y|b, b)
. (75)
The channel parameters pX , pY , and pZ in (67) can
be rewritten in terms of three quantum bit error rates
(QBERs) Qx, Qy, and Qz, which in each case corre-
sponds to the expected probability that Bob measures
a different state from what Alice sent with respect to a
given basis:
Qx :=
1
2
(〈−|N (|+〉〈+|)|−〉+ 〈+|N (|−〉〈−|)|+〉) , (76)
Qy :=
1
2
〈−i| N (|+i〉〈+i|) |−i〉
+
1
2
〈+i| N (|−i〉〈−i|) |+i〉 , (77)
Qz :=
1
2
(〈1|N (|0〉〈0|)|1〉+ 〈0|N (|1〉〈1|)|0〉) . (78)
The probabilities pX , pY , and pZ are then related to Qx,
Qy, and Qz as follows:
pX =
1
2
(Qz −Qx +Qy) , (79)
pY =
1
2
(Qx −Qy +Qz) , (80)
pZ =
1
2
(Qy −Qz +Qx) . (81)
See [Kha16, Chapter 2] for a derivation of these equa-
tions. In the six-state protocol, it is possible to estimate
all of the QBERs reliably, while in BB84, it is only pos-
sible to estimate Qx and Qz reliably.
Another further symmetrization of the protocol, in ad-
dition to channel twirling, is possible if Alice and Bob
discard the basis information in X1 and Y1. This is com-
monly employed in both the six-state and BB84 protocols
in order to simplify their analysis. Discarding the basis
information corresponds to tracing out the registers X1
and Y1 containing the basis information for Alice and
Bob, respectively:
ρsiftX2Y2E := TrX1Y1 [ρ
sift
X1X2Y1Y2E ] =
1∑
x,y=0
∑
b∈B
qAb q
B
b
psift
pX2Y2|X1Y1(x, y|b, b)|x, y〉〈x, y|X2Y2
⊗ ρb,x,yE , (82)
This discarding of basis information in either the six-
state or BB84 protocols is equivalent to a further channel
twirl. Let us consider first the six-state protocol, and let
T denote the following unitary
T := |+〉〈0| − i|−〉〈1| = 1√
2
[
1 −i
1 i
]
, (83)
so that T is a unitary changing the Pauli basis as
TXT † = Y, (84)
TY T † = Z, (85)
TZT † = X. (86)
Due to the fact that this gate swaps information encoded
into the Pauli eigenstates around, discarding of basis in-
formation in the six-state protocol is equivalent to a fur-
ther channel twirl as [Myh10, Section 2.2.7]
NQA→B(ωA)
:=
1
3
∑
j∈{0,1,2}
T j†NA→B(T jωAT j†)T j (87)
=
(
1− 3Q
2
)
ωA +
Q
2
(XωAX + Y ωAY + ZωAZ) ,
(88)
where
Q =
1
3
(Qx +Qy +Qz) . (89)
The channel NQA→B above is the well known quan-
tum depolarizing channel. It is completely positive for
Q ∈ [0, 2/3], and it is entanglement breaking when
Q ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. An entanglement breaking channel is not
capable of distilling secret key, as argued in [CLL04], with
a strong limitation for the finite-key regime established
in [WTB17].
Now let us consider the BB84 protocol. Let H denote
the following unitary Hadamard transformation:
H := |+〉〈0|+ |−〉〈1| = 1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, (90)
so that H changes the Pauli X and Z bases as HXH† =
Z and TZT † = X. Due to the fact that the H gate swaps
information encoded into the Pauli X and Z eigenstates
around, discarding of basis information in the BB84 pro-
tocol is equivalent to a further channel twirl as [Myh10,
Section 2.2.7]
NBB84,QA→B (ωA) :=
1
2
∑
j∈{0,1}
Hj†NA→B(HjωAHj†)Hj
(91)
= (1− 2Q+ s)ωA + (Q− s)XωAX
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+ sY ωAY + (Q− s)ZωAZ, (92)
where in this case
Q =
1
2
(Qx +Qz) , (93)
s = Q−Qy/2. (94)
The channel NBB84,QA→B is thus known as the BB84 channel
in the literature [SS08]. Observe that s ∈ [0, Q] and Q ∈
[0, (s+ 1)/2] in order for complete positivity to hold. By
computing the Choi state of this channel and using the
condition for separability from [ADH08], we find that the
BB84 channel is entanglement breaking for s ∈ [0, 1/2]
and Q ∈ [(s + 1/2)/2, (s + 1)/2]. As before, it is not
possible to distill secret key from the BB84 channel when
it is entanglement breaking.
We call a protocol in which the basis information is dis-
carded a “coarse-grained protocol”. We find analytic ex-
pressions for the key distillation rate of the coarse-grained
BB84 and six-state protocols in the following sections.
2. Six-state protocol
For the six-state protocol, we have B = Bsix-state =
{0, 1, 2}, corresponding to the X, Y , and Z bases. We
typically take qAb =
1
3 = q
B
b for all b ∈ B, so that psift =
1
3 . The joint distribution shared by Alice and Bob after
sifting is as follows:
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(b, x, b, y) =
qAb q
B
b
2psift
Tr[ΠbyNA→B(ρb,xA )], (95)
for b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Each of the relevant
entries is given by
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 0, 0, 0) =
1
6
(1−Qx), (96)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 0, 0, 1) =
1
6
Qx, (97)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 1, 0, 0) =
1
6
Qx, (98)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 1, 0, 1) =
1
6
(1−Qx), (99)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 0, 1, 0) =
1
6
(1−Qz), (100)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 0, 1, 1) =
1
6
Qz, (101)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 1, 1, 0) =
1
6
Qz, (102)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 1, 1, 1) =
1
6
(1−Qz), (103)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(2, 0, 2, 0) =
1
6
(1−Qy), (104)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(2, 0, 2, 1) =
1
6
Qy, (105)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(2, 1, 2, 0) =
1
6
Qy, (106)
p
6-state|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(2, 1, 2, 1) =
1
6
(1−Qy). (107)
Let us define the average QBER as
Q :=
1
3
(Qx +Qy +Qz). (108)
If Alice and Bob discard the basis information in X1 and
Y1, then the resulting probability distribution is
p
6-state|sift
X2Y2
(0, 0) =
1
2
(1−Q), (109)
p
6-state|sift
X2Y2
(0, 1) =
1
2
Q, (110)
p
6-state|sift
X2Y2
(1, 0) =
1
2
Q, (111)
p
6-state|sift
X2Y2
(1, 1) =
1
2
(1−Q). (112)
In other words, when discarding the basis information,
Alice and Bob’s data can be characterized by the single
parameter Q.
For the six-state protocol, there is a reliable estimate of
Eve’s collective attack. This means that the uncertainty
set S discussed in Section II A 3 has cardinality equal to
one. With the further assumption of discarding basis in-
formation, the average QBER Q uniquely identifies the
attack of Eve, as in (88). By following the derivations
in Appendix A, we find that the mutual and Holevo in-
formations and variances as a function of the average
QBER Q are as follows:
I(X;Y )ρ = 1− h2(Q), (113)
V (X;Y )ρ = Q(1−Q)
(
log2
(
1−Q
Q
))2
, (114)
I(X;E)ρ = −
(
1− 3Q
2
)
log2
(
1− 3Q
2
)
− 3Q
2
log2
(
Q
2
)
− h2(Q), (115)
V (X;E)ρ = Q+
(
1− 3Q
2
)(
log2
(
1− 3Q2
1−Q
))2
+
Q
2
(
log2
(
Q
2
1−Q
))2
− I(X;E)2ρ.
(116)
The achievable distillable key with direct reconciliation
is then given by evaluating the general formula in (31):
K6-state(Q,n, εI, εII) = 1 +
(
1− 3Q
2
)
log2
(
1− 3Q
2
)
+
3Q
2
log2
(
Q
2
)
+
√
Q(1−Q)
n
log2
(
1−Q
Q
)
Φ−1(εI)
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FIG. 1. Distillable key rates for the coarse-grained six-state
protocol after sifting with Q = 0.05. The purple solid line
indicates the asymptotic key rate.
+
√
V (X;E)ρ
n
Φ−1(εII). (117)
Figure 1 plots the second-order coding rate for key dis-
tillation using the six-state protocol. These rates can be
compared with the finite-key analysis from [AMKB11],
but the comparison is not necessarily fair, due to our
assumption of reliable parameter estimation.
We finally note that incorporating the methods of
[KR08] can improve the key rate.
3. BB84 DV-QKD protocol
For the BB84 protocol, we have B = BBB84 = {0, 1},
corresponding to the X and Z bases. We typically take
qAb =
1
2 = q
B
b for all b ∈ B, so that psift = 12 . The relevant
probability distribution is
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(b, x, b, y) =
qAb q
B
b
2psift
Tr[ΠbyNA→B(ρb,xA )], (118)
for b ∈ {0, 1} and x, y ∈ {0, 1}. We then have
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 0, 0, 0) =
1
4
(1−Qx), (119)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 0, 0, 1) =
1
4
Qx, (120)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 1, 0, 0) =
1
4
Qx, (121)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(0, 1, 0, 1) =
1
4
(1−Qx), (122)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 0, 1, 0) =
1
4
(1−Qz), (123)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 0, 1, 1) =
1
4
Qz, (124)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 1, 1, 0) =
1
4
Qz, (125)
p
BB84|sift
X1X2Y1Y2
(1, 1, 1, 1) =
1
4
(1−Qz) (126)
Let us define the average QBER as
Q :=
1
2
(Qx +Qz). (127)
If Alice and Bob discard the basis information in X1 and
Y1, then the probability distribution is
p
BB84|sift
X2Y2
(0, 0) =
1
2
(1−Q), (128)
p
BB84|sift
X2Y2
(0, 1) =
1
2
Q, (129)
p
BB84|sift
X2Y2
(1, 0) =
1
2
Q, (130)
p
BB84|sift
X2Y2
(1, 1) =
1
2
(1−Q). (131)
In other words, when discarding the basis information,
Alice and Bob’s classical data can be characterized using
the single parameter Q.
For the parameter estimation step of the protocol, it
is possible for Alice and Bob to determine the QBERs
Qx and Qz reliably. However, it is not possible to es-
timate Qy because the encoding and decoding do not
involve the eigenbasis of the Pauli Y operator. Thus,
the uncertainty set S in this case consists of all Pauli
channels satisfying (79)–(81) for fixed Qx and Qz. If we
further simplify the protocol by throwing away the basis
information, then the analysis simplifies. By following
the derivations in Appendix A, we find that the mutual
and Holevo informations and variances as a function of
the average QBER Q and the optimization parameter
s ∈ [0, Q] are as follows:
I(X;Y )ρ = 1− h2(Q), (132)
V (X;Y )ρ = Q(1−Q)
(
log2
(
1−Q
Q
))2
, (133)
I(X;E)ρ = H({1− 2Q+ s,Q− s,Q− s, s})
− h2(Q), (134)
V (X;E)ρ = (1− 2Q+ s)
(
log2
(
1− 2Q+ s
1−Q
))2
+ (Q− s)
(
log2
(
Q− s
1−Q
))2
+ (Q− s)
(
log2
(
Q− s
Q
))2
+ s
(
log2
(
s
Q
))2
− I(X;E)2ρ. (135)
The achievable key rate for direct reconciliation is then
given by evaluating the general formula in (31) and per-
forming an optimization over the parameter s ∈ [0, Q].
Figure 2 plots the second-order coding rate for key dis-
tillation using the BB84 protocol. These rates can be
compared with the finite-key analysis from [TL17], but
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tocol after sifting with Q = 0.05. The purple solid line indi-
cates the asymptotic key rate.
the comparison is not necessarily fair, due to our assump-
tion of reliable parameter estimation.
We again note that incorporating the methods of
[SRS08] can improve the key rate.
4. CV-QKD protocol with coherent states and heterodyne
detection
We finally analyze the performance of the CV-QKD
Gaussian modulation protocol with reverse reconcilia-
tion. This protocol involves Gaussian modulation of co-
herent states by Alice and heterodyne detection by Bob,
and it is a particular instance of the prepare-and-measure
protocol from Section II A.
The encoding ensemble EA in this case is
{pn(α), |α〉〈α|}α∈C , (136)
where n > 0, pn(α) is an isotropic complex Gaussian
distribution:
pn(α) :=
1
pin
exp
(
− |α|2 /n
)
, (137)
and |α〉〈α| is a coherent state [GK04] such that
|α〉 := e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉, (138)
with {|n〉}∞n=0 the orthonormal photon number basis.
The decoding POVM for Bob is heterodyne detection
[GK04], given by {
1
pi
|α〉〈α|
}
α∈C
. (139)
Let X be a complex random variable corresponding to
the choice of α in Alice’s encoding, and let Y be a com-
plex random variable corresponding to Bob’s measure-
ment outcome.
The encoding and decoding act on a single bosonic
mode, which implies that the channel NA→B that Eve
employs is a single-mode bosonic channel.
The channel twirling that Alice and Bob employ in
this case is the phase symmetrization from [KGW19].
In particular, before Alice sends out a coherent state,
she applies the unitary e−inˆφ, with the phase φ selected
uniformly at random from {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. She com-
municates this choice to Bob, who then applies einˆφ to
his received mode. They both then discard the classi-
cal memory of which phase φ was applied. This phase
symmetrization significantly reduces the number of pa-
rameters that Alice and Bob need to estimate in the pa-
rameter estimation part of the protocol. Like the other
protocols, this phase symmetrization need not be applied
in the quantum domain because the encoding ensemble in
(136) and the decoding POVM (139) are invariant under
the actions of Alice and Bob mentioned above. Thus, it
can be carried out in classical processing that keeps track
of the twirl.
During the parameter estimation step of the protocol,
Alice and Bob estimate
γ12 := E{(X − E{X})∗ (Y − E{Y })}, (140)
γ22 := E{|Y − E{Y }|2}. (141)
Here we also assume that they estimate pY |X(y|x). The
following parameter is known
γ11 := E{|X − E{X}|2}, (142)
being a function of Alice’s encoding ensemble. The un-
certainty set S in this case then consists of all single-mode
bosonic channels that lead to the estimates γ12 and γ22,
as well as pY |X(y|x). The achievable key rate is given
by evaluating the formula in (40) as a function of the
encoding in (136), the decoding in (139), and the set S
mentioned above. To evaluate this formula, we apply the
perturbative approach from [PPV10, Lemmas 63 and 64],
which is valid for sufficiently large n. In this approach, we
optimize the first-order Holevo information term of Eve
first, and then among all of the channels optimizing the
first-order term, we optimize the second-order Holevo in-
formation variance of Eve. In this case, the Gaussian ex-
tremality theorem of [WGC06], as observed in [GPC06],
implies that a Gaussian attack achieves the optimal first-
order Holevo information of Eve. The same conclusion
has been reached in [NGA06] by a different line of rea-
soning. In fact, by examining the proof in [NGA06]
and employing the faithfulness of quantum relative en-
tropy, we conclude that for every non-Gaussian attack,
there is a Gaussian attack that achieves a strictly higher
Holevo information of Eve. Thus, it suffices to optimize
Eve’s Holevo information over Gaussian attacks exclu-
sively, and among all of these Gaussian attacks, there
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is a unique one that achieves the optimum [Lev15, Ap-
pendix D], which is a thermal channel consistent with
the observed estimates γ11, γ12, and γ22. So applying
the perturbative approach mentioned above, there is no
need to perform a further optimization of the Holevo in-
formation variance of Eve, and we just evaluate it with
respect to the optimal and unique Gaussian attack.
We stress here that, even though the actual attack of
Eve need not be a Gaussian channel, the Gaussian op-
timality theorem and the perturbative extension of it is
useful in order to bound Eve’s information from above.
Without this result, the optimization would be too diffi-
cult (perhaps impossible) because the underlying Hilbert
space is infinite-dimensional.
Let us analyze the performance of the above proto-
col in a particular physical scenario. Suppose that the
underlying physical channel is indeed a thermal channel
Lη,NBA→B [Ser17], characterized by transmissivity η ∈ (0, 1)
and environment thermal photon number NB . However,
Alice and Bob are not aware of this, as is the usual case
in a QKD protocol. They execute the above protocol,
and after the parameter estimation phase, suppose that
they have estimated the classical channel pY |X(y|x) and
the parameters in (140)–(141). From the parameters in
(140)–(141), they conclude that the optimal Gaussian at-
tack of Eve is a thermal channel of transmissivity η and
environment thermal photon number NB . Let ULη,NBA→BE
be an isometric channel extending Lη,NBA→B . An isometric
channel extending Lη,NBA→B can be physically realized by
the action of a beamsplitter of transmissivity η acting
on the input mode A and one share E1 of a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state [CG06, CGH06], as
ULη,NBA→BE(ωA) = BηAE1→BE1(ωA ⊗ ψNBE1E2), (143)
where ωA is the input state, BηAE1→BE1 denotes the
beamsplitter channel of transmissivity η, the system E
consists of modes E1 and E2, and the two-mode squeezed
vacuum state ψNBE1E2 := |ψNB 〉〈ψNB |E1E2 is defined from
|ψNB 〉E1E2 :=
1√
NB + 1
∞∑
n=0
(√
NB
NB + 1
)n
|n〉E1 |n〉E2 .
(144)
We now calculate the various quantities in (40) for this
case and for a reverse reconciliation protocol. We be-
gin by determining the mutual information I(X;Y ) and
the mutual information variance V (X;Y ). The classical
channel pY |X(y|x) induced by heterodyne detection of a
Gaussian-distributed ensemble of coherent states trans-
mitted through the thermal channel Lη,NBA→B is as follows
(see, e.g., [Guh04, Sav12]):
pY |X(y|x) =
exp
(
− |y−
√
ηx|2
pi((1−η)NB+1)
)
pi ((1− η)NB + 1) , (145)
where x, y ∈ C. As mentioned previously, we assume that
this classical channel pY |X is reliably estimated during
the parameter estimation step. Then it follows that
I(X;Y ) = log2(1 + P ), (146)
V (X;Y ) =
1
ln2 2
P (P + 2)
(P + 1)
2 , (147)
where
P :=
ηn¯
(1− η)NB + 1 . (148)
The formulas above follow from the fact that the chan-
nel pY |X(y|x) in (145) can be understood as two in-
dependent real Gaussian channels each with signal-to-
noise ratio P , and then by applying Shannon’s formula
[Sha48] and the mutual information variance formula
from [PPV10, TT15a] (with a prefactor of two to account
for the two independent channels).
We now turn to calculating the Holevo information
I(Y ;E) and the Holevo information variance V (Y ;E),
the latter of which can be calculated as a special case
of Proposition 2 below. For a Gaussian-distributed en-
semble of coherent states as in (137), the expected in-
put density operator is a thermal state of the following
form [Ser17]:
θ(n¯) :=
1
n¯+ 1
∞∑
n=0
(
n¯
n¯+ 1
)n
|n〉〈n|, (149)
with covariance matrix V (n¯) := (2n¯+ 1) I2, where I2
is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. It then follows that the
covariance matrix of the state ρBE := ULη,NBA→BE(θ(n¯)) is
VBE :=
[
VB VBE
VBE VE
]
(150)
:= (B(η)⊕ I2) (V (n¯)⊕ VE(NB))
(
BT (η)⊕ I2
)
,
(151)
where
B(η) :=
[ √
ηI2
√
1− ηI2
−√1− ηI2 √ηI2
]
, (152)
VE(NB) :=
[
(2NB + 1) I2 2
√
NB(NB + 1)σZ
2
√
NB(NB + 1)σZ (2NB + 1) I2
]
.
(153)
For this example, note that Eve’s actual attack and Al-
ice and Bob’s estimation of it coincide, due to our as-
sumption that the underlying channel is a thermal chan-
nel. We then obtain the covariance matrix of the reduced
state ρE = TrB [ρBE ] from the above, which can be used
to calculate the entropy H(E)ρ. The covariance matrix
of the reduced state ρyE of Eve’s system, given the out-
come y of Bob’s heterodyne detection is as follows:
VE|Y := VE − VBE (VB + I2)−1 V TBE , (154)
and the probability of obtaining the outcome y is
pY (y) :=
exp
(
− |y|2pi(ηn¯+(1−η)NB+1)
)
pi (ηn¯+ (1− η)NB + 1) . (155)
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This allows us to compute the conditional entropy as
H(E|Y ) =
∫
dy pY (y)H(E)ρy . (156)
Now combining H(E)ρ−H(E|Y ) = I(Y ;E), we can cal-
culate Eve’s Holevo information.
To calculate the Holevo information variance V (Y ;E),
we apply the formula from Proposition 2 below. To un-
derstand this formula, we first provide a definition for a
Gaussian ensemble of quantum Gaussian states.
Definition 1 (Gaussian ensemble) A Gaussian en-
semble of m-mode Gaussian states consists of a Gaussian
prior probability distribution of the form
pY (y) := N (µ,Σ) (157)
:=
exp
(
− 12 (y − µ)T Σ−1 (y − µ)
)
√
(2pi)
2n
det(Σ)
, (158)
and a set {ρyE}y∈R2n of Gaussian states, each having
2m× 1 mean vector Wy + ν and 2m× 2m quantum co-
variance matrix V . In the above, y is a 2n× 1 vector, µ
is the 2n × 1 mean vector of the random vector Y , Σ is
the 2n×2n covariance matrix of the random vector Y , W
is a 2m× 2n matrix, and ν is a 2m-dimensional vector.
Proposition 2 The Holevo information of the ensemble
in Definition 1 is given by
I(Y ;E) =
1
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] + Tr[WΣWTGE ]
]
, (159)
and the Holevo information variance of the ensemble in
Definition 1 is given by
V (Y ;E) =
1
8 ln2 2
[
Tr[(∆V )
2
] + Tr[(∆Ω)
2
]
]
+
1
2 ln2 2
[
Tr[WΣWTGEV GE ] + Tr[
(
WΣWTGE
)2
]
]
,
(160)
where
Z := det([V + iΩ] /2), (161)
G := 2iΩ arcoth(iV Ω), (162)
VE := V + 2WΣW
T , (163)
ZE := det([VE + iΩ] /2), (164)
GE := 2iΩ arcoth(iVEΩ), (165)
∆ := GE −G. (166)
See Appendix H for a review of quantum Gaussian
states and measurements and for a proof of Proposition 2.
Putting everything above together, we find that the
achievable secret key rate is given by evaluating the above
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FIG. 3. Distillable key rates for the reverse reconciliation
CV-QKD protocol, when conducted over a thermal channel
with transmissivity η = 0.2 and environment photon number
NB = 10
−2. The purple solid line indicates the asymptotic
key rate.
quantities in the formula in (40). Figure 3 plots the
second-order coding rate for key distillation using the
CV-QKD reverse reconciliation protocol. One can com-
pare these rates to the finite-key analysis presented in
[Lev15], but the comparison is not necessarily fair due to
our assumption of reliable parameter estimation.
C. Routes to a full second-order analysis that
includes parameter estimation
As we have mentioned in Section II A 3, our second-
order analysis above is incomplete, in the sense that it
does not incorporate details of the parameter estimation
step. That is, we have assumed that k is large enough
to allow for a reliable estimate of the induced classical
channel pY |X , and from there, we applied a second-order
analysis to the key distillation step. Here we discuss a
potential route around this issue and an avenue for future
work on this topic.
For finite-dimensional protocols, the collective attack
of Eve is constrained to a finite-dimensional quantum
channel. This quantum channel is realized by a unitary
acting on a larger, yet finite-dimensional Hilbert space. If
we limit Eve to a finite set of quantum computations that
can be realized from a finite, universal gate set, which
could in principle realize any unitary on the space to
any desired accuracy, then the resulting channel is se-
lected from a very large, yet finite and known set. In this
case, the parameter estimation procedure of [Pol13, Sec-
tion III-D] can be applied, and it has negligible overhead.
Indeed, it is possible to estimate the channel chosen from
a finite set with k = O(log n) and such that the decod-
ing error probability is increased by no more than 1/
√
n,
which has no impact on the second-order terms in (31)
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and (40) for sufficiently large n. However, the main draw-
back of this approach is that, even though this constraint
on the eavesdropper might be considered reasonable, it
is still a computational assumption and thus lies out-
side the quantum information-theoretic security that is
ultimately desired in quantum key distribution. Further-
more, this does not address CV-QKD protocols in which
there is not a finite-dimensional assumption.
Another approach to address the issue is to incorpo-
rate recent advances in universal coding up to the sec-
ond order [Hay19]. A universal code does not depend on
the particular channel over which communication is being
conducted, and it only requires an estimate of the first-
and second-order terms. This approach has been ana-
lyzed in detail in [Hay19], and it is likely that it could be
combined with the information-theoretic protocol consid-
ered in this paper and the parameter estimation step in
order to arrive at a full second-order analysis for both
the parameter estimation and key distillation steps in
a quantum key distribution protocol. A benefit of this
approach is that quantum information-theoretic security
would be retained. We leave a full investigation of this
approach for future work.
III. PRIVATE COMMUNICATION OVER A
COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH
FIXED MARGINAL
We now present the one-shot information-theoretic re-
sults that underlie the previous claims for key distillation
in quantum key distribution. We begin by considering
private communication over a compound wiretap chan-
nel with fixed marginal, and then in Section IV, we move
on to a key distillation protocol for a compound wiretap
source with fixed marginal.
A. One-shot setting
In the setting of private communication, we suppose
that Alice, Bob, and Eve are connected by means of the
following classical–quantum–quantum (cqq) compound
wiretap channel with fixed marginal:
N sX→BE : x→ ρx,sBE , (167)
where the classical input x ∈ X , the alphabet X is count-
able, the index s ∈ S represents the choice or state of the
channel, the set S can be uncountable, and ρx,sBE is a
density operator acting on the tensor-product separable
Hilbert space HB ⊗ HE . We suppose that the channel
has a fixed marginal; i.e, the reduced Alice-Bob channel
N sX→B : x→ ρx,sB := TrE [ρx,sBE ] (168)
is known to Alice and Bob, so that
ρx,sB = ρ
x
B for all s ∈ S. (169)
However, the reduced s-dependent Alice-Eve channel
N sX→E : x→ ρx,sE := TrB [ρx,sBE ] (170)
is not fully known to or characterized by Alice or Bob
during their communication. Thus, the channel N sX→BE
is a particular member of a set S of channels, for which
TrE [ρ
x,s
BE ] = ρ
x
B for all s ∈ S. (171)
To be clear, we suppose that the set S is known to Alice
and Bob, but the particular channel indexed by s ∈ S,
which is actually being employed during the communi-
cation protocol, is not known. The goal of a private
communication protocol is for Alice to send a message
securely to Bob, such that it is secure against the chan-
nel N sX→BE for all s ∈ S.
The action of the channel in (167) can be described in
the fully quantum picture as follows:
N sX→BE(ωX) :=
∑
x
〈x|XωX |x〉Xρx,sBE , (172)
where {|x〉X}x∈X is a countable orthonormal basis for an
input separable Hilbert space HX .
In our model of communication, we suppose also that
public shared randomness is available for free to Alice
and Bob. Since it is public, Eve gets a copy of all of the
shared randomness.
Let ΨRARBRE denote the following public shared ran-
domness state:
ΨRARBRE :=
|R|∑
r=1
p(r)|r〉〈r|RA ⊗ |r〉〈r|RB ⊗ |r〉〈r|RE ,
(173)
whereR is the alphabet for the shared randomness, Alice
possesses the classical register RA, Bob RB , and Eve RE .
The systems RA, RB , and RE have the same dimension.
A private coding scheme for the channel in (167) consists
of the public shared randomness state ΨRARBRE , an en-
coding channel ERAM→X taking the register RA and a
message register M to the channel input register X, and
a decoding channel DRBB→Mˆ . Two parameters εI and
εII determine the decoding error probability and the se-
curity of the protocol, respectively. Alice uses the cod-
ing scheme and the channel in (167) to send a message
m ∈M, whereM is the message alphabet, and the con-
ditional probability of decoding as m′ ∈M is given by
Pr[Mˆ = m′|M = m] := 〈m′|MˆDRBB→Mˆ (ρmBRB )|m′〉Mˆ ,
(174)
where
ρmBRB := TrERE [ρ
m,s
BERBRE
], (175)
ρm,sBERBRE :=
(N sX→BE ◦ ERAM→X)(|m〉〈m|M ⊗ΨRARBRE ). (176)
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Note that the reduced state ρmBRB has no dependence on
s, due to the assumption stated in (171). To see (174) in a
different way, we can alternatively consider Bob’s positive
operator-valued measure
{
ΛmRBB
}
m∈M to consist of the
following elements:
ΛmRBB := (DRBB→Mˆ )†(|m〉〈m|Mˆ ), (177)
where (DRBB→Mˆ )† is the Hilbert–Schmidt adjoint of
the decoding channel DRBB→Mˆ , so that we can write
Pr[Mˆ = m′|M = m] in terms of the Born rule as
Pr[Mˆ = m′|M = m] = Tr[Λm′RBBρmBRB ]. (178)
The protocol is εI-reliable, with εI ∈ [0, 1], if the following
condition holds for all m ∈M:
Pr[Mˆ = m|M = m] ≥ 1− εI. (179)
Equivalently, we require that
sup
m∈M
(
1− Pr[Mˆ = m|M = m]
)
≤ εI. (180)
The protocol is εII-secret, with εII ∈ [0, 1], if for all
channel states s ∈ S, there exists a fixed state σsERE of
Eve’s systems, such that for all messages m ∈ M, the
following inequality holds
1
2
∥∥ρm,sERE − σsERE∥∥1 ≤ εII. (181)
Equivalently, we require that
sup
s∈S
inf
σsERE
sup
m∈M
1
2
∥∥ρm,sERE − σsERE∥∥1 ≤ εII. (182)
Thus, for each s ∈ S, the protocol allows for send-
ing a message securely, such that the eavesdropper can-
not determine the message m, no matter which channel
N sX→BE is selected from S.
The number of private bits communicated by the
scheme is equal to log2 |M|. Thus, a given protocol for
private communication over the channel in (167) is de-
scribed by the three parameters |M|, εI, and εII.
We remark that this setting reduces to the traditional
one-shot, shared-randomness-assisted private communi-
cation setting considered in quantum information theo-
retic contexts in the case that |S| = 1. See [Wil17a] for
details of this special case.
B. Distinguishability and information measures
Before stating Theorem 3 regarding the number of pri-
vate messages that can be transmitted in the above set-
ting, we briefly review the basic distinguishability mea-
sures and information quantities needed to understand
the statement of Theorem 3.
Let ρ and σ be states acting on a separable Hilbert
space H. The hypothesis testing relative entropy
DεH(ρ‖σ) is defined for ε ∈ [0, 1] as [BD10, BD11, WR12]
DεH(ρ‖σ) := − log2 inf
Λ≥0
{Tr[Λσ] : Tr[Λρ] ≥ 1− ε,Λ ≤ I} .
(183)
Note that, without loss of generality, we can set the first
constraint above to be an equality [KW17], so that
DεH(ρ‖σ) = − log2 inf
Λ≥0
{Tr[Λσ] : Tr[Λρ] = 1− ε, Λ ≤ I} .
(184)
The max-relative entropy Dmax(ρ‖σ) is defined as
[Dat09b]
Dmax(ρ‖σ) := inf
{
λ : ρ ≤ 2λσ} . (185)
The following alternative characterization of Dmax(ρ‖σ)
is well known [Dat09a]:
Dmax(ρ‖σ) =
inf
λ,ω≥0
{
λ : σ = 2−λρ+
(
1− 2−λ)ω, Tr[ω] = 1} , (186)
which allows for thinking of σ as a convex combination
of ρ and some other state ω. The smooth max-relative
entropy for ε ∈ [0, 1] is defined as [Dat09b]
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) :=
inf
{
λ : ρ˜ ≤ 2λσ, ρ˜ ≥ 0, Tr[ρ˜] = 1, P (ρ˜, ρ) ≤ ε} ,
(187)
where the sine distance P (ρ˜, ρ) is defined as [Ras02,
Ras03, Ras06, GLN05]
P (ρ˜, ρ) :=
√
1− F (ρ˜, ρ), (188)
F (ρ˜, ρ) :=
∥∥∥√ρ˜√ρ∥∥∥2
1
, (189)
the latter quantity being the quantum fidelity [Uhl76].
Let ρAE be a state acting on a separable Hilbert space
HA ⊗ HE . Then a mutual-information like quantity is
defined for ε ∈ [0, 1] as
Dεmax(ρAE‖ρA ⊗ ρE). (190)
We also define the alternate smooth max-mutual infor-
mation as [AJW19b, Wil17a]
I˜εmax(E;A)ρ := inf
ρ˜AE :P (ρ˜AE ,ρAE)≤ε
Dmax(ρ˜AE‖ρA ⊗ ρ˜E).
(191)
A simple relation between these two generalizations of
mutual information is given in Appendix B. Note that we
adopt the particular notation in (191) in order to main-
tain consistency with the notation of [BCR11].
The hypothesis testing mutual information of a bi-
partite state ρAB acting on a separable Hilbert space
HA ⊗HE is defined for ε ∈ [0, 1] as [WR12]
IεH(A;B)ρ := D
ε
H(ρAB‖ρA ⊗ ρB). (192)
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C. Private communication via position-based
coding and convex splitting
The communication protocol that we develop here
is the same as that considered in [Wil17a], but with
the added observation that its security holds univer-
sally for any channel selected from the set S and for
channels whose output states act on a separable Hilbert
space. The protocol from [Wil17a] built upon the ideas of
position-based coding and convex splitting, which were in
turn introduced in [AJW19b] and [ADJ17], respectively.
Our main one-shot achievability theorem, for the commu-
nication setting described in Section III A, is as follows:
Theorem 3 Fix εI, εII ∈ (0, 1), ηI ∈ (0, εI), and ηII ∈
(0,
√
εII). Then the following quantity is an achievable
number of private message bits that can be transmitted
over the compound wiretap channel in (167), with de-
coding error probability not larger than εI and security
parameter not larger than εII:
sup
pX
[
IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs
]
− log2(4εI/η2I )− 2 log2(1/2ηII), (193)
where the entropic quantities are evaluated with respect
to the following state:
ρsXBE :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sBE . (194)
Proof. Consider the compound wiretap channel in (167).
Let pX be a probability distribution over the channel in-
put alphabet X . Let ρXX′X′′ denote the following public
shared randomness state:
ρXX′X′′ :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |x〉〈x|X′ ⊗ |x〉〈x|X′′ .
(195)
We suppose that Alice, Bob, and Eve share the state
ρ
⊗|M||R|
XX′X′′ (196)
before communication begins and that the X systems are
indexed as Xm,r, i.e., in lexicographic order by m ∈ M
and r ∈ R, where R := {1, . . . , |R|}. Alice possesses all
of the X systems, Bob the X ′ systems, and Eve the X ′′
systems.
To send the message m ∈M, Alice’s encoding consists
of picking r ∈ R uniformly at random from the set R,
and then she sends the classical system Xm,r through
the channel in (172). For fixed values of m, r, and s, the
global shared state at this point is given by
ρm,r,s
X|M||R|X′|M||R|X′′|M||R|BE := ρX1,1X′1,1X′′1,1 ⊗ · · ·
⊗ ρXm,r−1X′m,r−1X′′m,r−1 ⊗ ρsXm,rX′m,rX′′m,rBE⊗
ρXm,r+1X′m,r+1X′′m,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX|M|,|R|X′|M|,|R|X′′|M|,|R| ,
(197)
where
ρsXm,rX′m,rX′′m,rBE :=∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x, x, x〉〈x, x, x|Xm,rX′m,rX′′m,r ⊗ ρx,sBE . (198)
The resulting state of Bob, for fixed values m and r, is
as follows:
ρm,r
X′|M||R|B := ρX′1,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′m,r−1 ⊗ ρX′m,rB
⊗ ρX′m,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′|M|,|R| , (199)
where
ρX′m,rB :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X′m,r ⊗ ρxB . (200)
By employing the sequential and position-based decoding
scheme from [OMW19] (which has been shown therein
to hold for states acting on separable Hilbert spaces), it
follows that Bob can decode both the message m and r
with probability not smaller than 1− εI as long as
log2(|M| |R|) = IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − log2(4εI/η2I ), (201)
where ηI ∈ (0, εI) and
ρXB :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB . (202)
To Eve, who is unaware of the random choice of the
local randomness variable r ∈ R, the state of her systems
for a fixed value of the message m is as follows:
ρm,s
X′′|M||R|E :=
1
|R|
∑
r∈R
ρX′′1,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′′m,r−1 ⊗ ρsX′′m,rE
⊗ ρX′′m,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′′|M|,|R| (203)
By the invariance of the trace distance with respect to
tensor-product states, i.e., ‖σ ⊗ τ − ω ⊗ τ‖1 = ‖σ − ω‖1,
we find that
1
2
∥∥ρm,s
X′′|M||R|E − ρX′′|M||R| ⊗ ρ˜sE
∥∥
1
=
1
2
∥∥∥ρm,sX′′m,1...X′′m,|R|E − ρX′′m,1...X′′m,|R| ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥∥1 , (204)
for any state ρ˜sE . It follows from the smooth universal
convex-split lemma (see Appendix C) that if
log2 |R| = sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs + 2 log2(1/2ηII), (205)
then the following bound holds for all m ∈M and for all
s ∈ S
1
2
∥∥ρm,s
X′′|M||R|E − ρX′′|M||R| ⊗ ρ˜sE
∥∥
1
≤ εII, (206)
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where the state ρ˜sE satisfies P (ρ˜
s
E , ρ
s
E) ≤
√
εII −
ηII and the alternate smooth max-mutual information
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs is evaluated with respect to the state
ρsXE :=
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sE . (207)
The analysis of this step is similar to that given in
[Wil17a]. We provide details of the smooth universal
convex-split lemma, as applicable to states acting on sep-
arable Hilbert spaces, in Appendix C. Thus, the number
of private message bits that can be established with this
scheme is equal to
log2 |M| = IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs
− log2(4εI/η2I )− 2 log2(1/2ηII). (208)
Since the above number of private message bits is achiev-
able for a fixed distribution pX , it is then possible to op-
timize over all distributions to conclude that it is possible
to send the following number of private message bits:
log2 |M| =
sup
pX
[
IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs
]
− log2(4εI/η2I )− 2 log2(1/2ηII), (209)
concluding the proof.
Remark 4 If desired, this private communication
scheme can be derandomized along the lines shown in
[Wil17a], in order to end up with a scheme that does
not require public shared randomness. After doing so,
the protocol is no longer guaranteed to be secure against
an arbitrary state of the eavesdropper in the uncertainty
set S. The resulting protocol is only guaranteed to be se-
cure against a fixed, known eavesdropper, similar to the
standard information-theoretic model of private commu-
nication from [Dev05, CWY04].
IV. SECRET KEY DISTILLATION FROM A
COMPOUND QUANTUM WIRETAP SOURCE
WITH FIXED MARGINAL
A. One-shot setting
The setting of secret key distillation from a compound
quantum wiretap source with fixed marginal can be con-
sidered the static version of the dynamic setting pre-
sented in Section III A, and so many aspects are similar.
In this setting, we suppose that Alice has system X, Bob
system B, and Eve system E of the following classical–
quantum–quantum compound wiretap source state with
fixed marginal:
ρsXBE :=
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sBE , (210)
where s ∈ S. In this model, the marginal state of Alice
and Bob is fixed, such that they know their reduced state
ρXB . That is,
ρx,sB = ρ
x
B for all s ∈ S, (211)
where
ρx,sB := TrE [ρ
x,s
BE ], (212)
but they do not know the full state. We suppose that
forward public classical communication from Alice to Bob
is allowed for free. The goal is to use this compound
wiretap source state in (210), along with the free public
classical communication, in order to distill a key that is
secure for all ρsXBE and s ∈ S.
A secret key distillation scheme consists of a classi-
cal encoding channel EX→KL and a decoding channel
DLB→Kˆ . In the above, K is the classical key register
of Alice, and L is a classical register communicated to
Bob. Two parameters εI and εII determine the error
probability when decoding and the security of the proto-
col, respectively. Alice uses the distillation scheme and
the state in (210) to produce a uniformly random key
value k ∈ K (the probability Pr[K = k] = 1/ |K|), and
the conditional probability of Bob decoding k′ ∈ K from
his systems is given by
Pr[Kˆ = k′|K = k] := 〈k′|KˆDLB→Kˆ(ρkKLB)|k′〉Kˆ , (213)
where
ρkKLB := TrE [ρ
k,s
KLBE ], (214)
ρk,sKLBE :=
〈k|KEX→KL(ρXBE)|k〉K
Pr[K = k]
, (215)
= 〈k|KEX→KL(ρXBE)|k〉K · |K| . (216)
Alternatively, we can consider Bob’s positive operator-
valued measure
{
ΛkLB
}
k∈K to consist of the following el-
ements
ΛkLB := (DLB→Kˆ)†(|k〉〈k|Kˆ), (217)
where (DLB→Kˆ)† is the Hilbert–Schmidt adjoint of the
decoding channel DLB→Kˆ , so that we can write the prob-
ability Pr[Kˆ = k′|K = k] in terms of the Born rule as
Pr[Kˆ = k′|K = k] = Tr[Λk′LBρkKLB ]. (218)
The protocol is εI-reliable, with εI ∈ [0, 1], if the following
condition holds for all k ∈ K:
Pr[Kˆ = k|K = k] ≥ 1− εI. (219)
Equivalently, we require that
sup
k∈K
(
1− Pr[Kˆ = k|K = k]
)
≤ εI. (220)
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The protocol is εII-secret, with εII ∈ [0, 1], if for all source
values s ∈ S, there exists fixed state σsERE of Eve’s sys-
tems, such that for all key values k ∈ K, the following
inequality holds
1
2
∥∥∥ρk,sLE − σsLE∥∥∥
1
≤ εII. (221)
Equivalently, we require that
sup
s∈S
inf
σsLE
sup
k∈K
1
2
∥∥∥ρk,sLE − σsLE∥∥∥
1
≤ εII. (222)
Thus, for each s ∈ S, the protocol allows for distilling
a secure key no matter which state ρsXBE is selected
from S.
The number of key bits established by the scheme is
equal to log2 |K|. Thus, a given protocol for secret key
distillation using the source in (210) is described by the
three parameters |K|, εI, and εII.
We remark here that the definition given above im-
plies the usual trace-distance based criterion [KRBM07]
for security that is commonly employed in quantum key
distribution. Let K and Kˆ denote the respective classi-
cal key registers of Alice and Bob (we identify both the
random variable and the system label with the same sym-
bol). Then the final state of the protocol, for fixed s ∈ S,
can be written as follows:
ρs
KKˆLE
:=
∑
k
1
|K| |k〉〈k|K ⊗
∑
k′
p(k′|k)|k′〉〈k′|Kˆ ⊗ ρk,sLE ,
(223)
where p(k′|k) := Tr[Λk′LBρkKLB ], while the ideal state, for
the same s, is as follows:
ΦKKˆ ⊗ σsLE , (224)
for some fixed state σsLE and where ΦKKˆ :=∑
k
1
|K| |k〉〈k|K ⊗ |k〉〈k|Kˆ . The conditions in (219) and
(222) and the triangle inequality for trace distance imply
that
1
2
∥∥ρs
KKˆLE
− ΦKKˆ ⊗ σsLE
∥∥
1
≤ εI + εII, (225)
which is the standard trace-distance based criterion con-
sidered in the context of secret key distillation.
We end this section by remarking that this setting
reduces to the traditional one-shot, secret key distilla-
tion setting from a known source, considered in quan-
tum information-theoretic contexts [RR12], in the case
that |S| = 1.
B. Secret key distillation via position-based coding
and convex splitting
Our main one-shot achievability theorem, correspond-
ing to the key distillation setting discussed in the previous
section, is as follows:
Theorem 5 Fix εI, εII ∈ (0, 1), ηI ∈ (0, εI), and ηII ∈
(0,
√
εII). Then the following quantity is an achievable
number of secret key bits that can be distilled from the
compound wiretap source in (210), with decoding error
probability not larger than εI and security parameter not
larger than εII:
IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs
− log2(4εI/η2I )− 2 log2(1/2ηII), (226)
where the entropic quantities are evaluated with respect
to the state in (210).
Proof. The secret key distillation scheme consists of
the following steps. Alice, Bob, and Eve begin with the
classical–quantum–quantum state in (210). Alice picks a
value k ∈ K uniformly at random, and she picks a value
r ∈ R uniformly at random, where R := {1, . . . , |R|}.
She then labels her X system of the state in (210) by the
pair (k, r), as Xk,r. She prepares |K| |R|−1 independent
instances of the classical state
ρX =
∑
x∈X
pX(x)|x〉〈x| (227)
and labels the systems as X1,1, . . . , Xk,r−1, Xk,r+1, . . . ,
X|K||R|. Alice sends the classical registers X1,1, . . . ,
X|K||R| in lexicographic order over a public classical com-
munication channel, so that Bob and Eve receive copies
of them. For fixed values of k, r, and s, the global shared
state at this point is given by
ρk,r,s
X|K||R|X′|K||R|X′′|K||R|BE := ρX1,1X′1,1X′′1,1 ⊗ · · ·
⊗ ρXk,r−1X′k,r−1X′′k,r−1 ⊗ ρsXk,rX′k,rX′′k,rBE
⊗ ρXk,r+1X′k,r+1X′′k,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX|K|,|R|X′|K|,|R|X′′|K|,|R| .
(228)
Thus, the reduced state of Bob, for fixed k and r, is as
follows:
ρk,r
X′|K||R|B := ρX′1,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′k,r−1 ⊗ ρX′k,rB
⊗ ρX′k,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′|K|,|R| . (229)
The reduced state of Eve, for a fixed value of k and s, is
as follows:
ρk,s
X′′|K||R|E :=
1
|R|
∑
r∈R
ρX′1,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′k,r−1 ⊗ ρsX′k,rE
⊗ ρX′k,r+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρX′|K|,|R| . (230)
These reduced states are exactly the same as they are in
(199) and (203), and so the same analysis applies. Bob
decodes both the key value k and the local randomness
value r with success probability not smaller than 1− εI,
as long as
log2(|K| |R|) = IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − log2(4εI/η2I ), (231)
21
while the following security condition holds for all k ∈ K
and s ∈ S:
1
2
∥∥∥ρk,sX′′|K||R|E − ρX′′|K||R| ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥∥1 ≤ εII, (232)
for some state ρ˜sE , as long as
log2 |R| = sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs + 2 log2(1/2ηII). (233)
Thus, the number of key bits that can be established with
this scheme is equal to
log2 |K| = IεI−ηIH (X;B)ρ − sup
s∈S
I˜
√
εII−ηII
max (E;X)ρs
− log2(4εI/η2I )− 2 log2(1/2ηII), (234)
as claimed.
V. SECOND-ORDER ASYMPTOTICS OF
PRIVATE COMMUNICATION AND SECRET
KEY DISTILLATION
In this section, we show how to apply the one-shot re-
sults from Sections III and IV to the case of independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) resources. First, let
us suppose that Alice, Bob, and Eve are connected by
means of a cqq compound wiretap channel of the form
in (167):
N sX→BE : x→ ρx,sBE , (235)
with all the same assumptions discussed previously in
Section III A. However, now we allow them to use the
channel multiple times, and we suppose that the par-
ticular value of s is fixed but unknown for all channel
uses. Thus, the resource they are employing for private
communication is the tensor-power channel (N sX→BE)⊗n,
where n is a large positive integer. This setting is directly
related to a collective attack in quantum key distribution,
as discussed in Section II.
By applying the result of Theorem 3 to this setting, in-
voking Lemma 6 and the second-order asymptotic expan-
sions discussed in (F5) and Corollary 10, with ηI = ηII =
1/
√
n, we find that it is possible to send private message
bits at the following rate, for sufficiently large n, with de-
coding error probability not larger than εI and security
parameter not larger than εII:
log2 |M|
n
= sup
pX
I(X;B)ρ +
√
1
n
V (X;B)ρΦ
−1(εI)
− sup
s∈S
[
I(X;E)ρs −
√
1
n
V (X;E)ρsΦ
−1(εII)
]
+O
(
log n
n
)
. (236)
In the above, the information quantities are evaluated
with respect to the following classical–quantum state:
ρsXBE :=
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sBE , (237)
and
I(X;B)ρ :=
∑
x
pX(x)D(ρ
x
B‖ρB), (238)
I(X;E)ρs :=
∑
x
pX(x)D(ρ
x,s
E ‖ρsE) (239)
ρB :=
∑
x
pX(x)ρ
x
B , (240)
ρsE :=
∑
x
pX(x)ρ
x,s
E . (241)
The Holevo information variances V (X;B)ρ and
V (X;E)ρs are given by
V (X;B)ρ :=∑
x∈X
pX(x)
[
V (ρxB‖ρB) + [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2
]
− [I(X;B)ρ]2 ,
(242)
V (X;E)ρs :=∑
x∈X
pX(x)
[
V (ρx,sE ‖ρsE) + [D(ρx,sE ‖ρsE)]2
]
−[I(X;E)ρs ]2 ,
(243)
with these formulas considered in more detail in Ap-
pendix G. The term O
(
logn
n
)
hides constants involv-
ing εI, εII, T (X;B)ρ, and T (X;E)ρs , with the latter
two quantities defined in Appendix G. By noting that
all of the quantities I(X;B)ρ, I(X;E)ρs , V (X;B)ρ,
V (X;E)ρs , T (X;B)ρ, and T (X;E)ρs involve an expec-
tation with respect to the distribution pX , it follows from
an approximation argument that the same formula in
(236) is an achievable rate for private communication
when pX is a probability distribution over a continuous
alphabet. In this case, all of the expectations for the
various quantities are evaluated by integration.
In the case that the states involved in the above formu-
las act on separable Hilbert spaces, then we should define
the various quantities in more detail because the formu-
las in (38) and (39) need to be interpreted in a particular
way (that is, the trace cannot be taken with respect to
an arbitrary orthonormal basis). Suppose that ρ and σ
have the following spectral decompositions:
ρ =
∑
x
λx|ψx〉〈ψx|, σ =
∑
y
µy|φy〉〈φy|. (244)
Then the quantum relative entropy [Fal70, Lin73] and the
relative entropy variance [TH13, Li14, KW17] are defined
as
D(ρ‖σ) :=
∑
x,y
|〈φy|ψx〉|2 λx log2
(
λx
µy
)
, (245)
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V (ρ‖σ) :=
∑
x,y
|〈φy|ψx〉|2 λx
[
log2
(
λx
µy
)
−D(ρ‖σ)
]2
.
(246)
We can also consider the application to secret key dis-
tillation. Suppose now that Alice, Bob, and Eve share
n copies of the following cqq state:
ρsXBE :=
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sBE , (247)
with all of the same assumptions discussed previously in
Section IV B. Then by the same reasoning as given above,
but this time applying Theorem 5, the following formula
represents an achievable rate for secret key distillation,
for sufficiently large n and with decoding error probabil-
ity not larger than εI and security parameter not larger
than εII:
log2 |K|
n
= I(X;B)ρ +
√
1
n
V (X;B)ρΦ
−1(εI)
− sup
s∈S
[
I(X;E)ρs −
√
1
n
V (X;E)ρsΦ
−1(εII)
]
+O
(
log n
n
)
, (248)
where all information quantities are evaluated with re-
spect to the state in (247).
VI. DISCUSSION OF COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
IN QKD AND THE COMPOUND WIRETAP
CHANNEL AND SOURCE
As mentioned in the introduction, from what we can
gather by combing through the literature, it seems that
there is a disconnect between the community of re-
searchers working on security proofs against collective at-
tacks in quantum key distribution and those working on
key distillation from a compound wiretap source. Thus,
one contribution of this paper is to connect these two re-
search directions, with Theorem 5 and its applications in
Sections II and V providing a direct link between them.
The main purpose of this section is to trace some of
the historical developments and early roots of these dis-
parate communities. This might help with unifying them
going forward. To begin with, let us note that there are
several reviews of quantum key distribution in which col-
lective attacks are discussed [SBPC+09, Lu¨t14, DLQY16,
XMZ+19]. Furthermore, there is a recent review of the
compound wiretap channel that traces its development
in classical information theory [SBP15].
The compound channel for classical communication
was introduced in [BBT59, Wol59]. The basic idea here is
that the actual communication channel is chosen from an
uncertainty set {psY |X}s, it is the same over a large block-
length (used in an i.i.d. way), and the goal is to be able
to communicate regardless of which channel is selected.
The main result of [BBT59, Wol59] is that Shannon’s
formula for capacity becomes modified to
max
pX
min
s
I(X;Y )ps , (249)
where psXY = pXp
s
Y |X .
The classical wiretap channel pY Z|X and its private ca-
pacity were introduced in [Wyn75] and studied further by
[CK78, Csi96, MW00]. In this model, the sender inputs
the random variable X, the legitimate receiver obtains Y ,
and the wiretapper (eavesdropper) Z. The conditional
probability distribution pY Z|X is known to all parties in-
volved. The culmination of these papers was to identify
the formula
max
U↔X↔Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)] (250)
as the private capacity of an arbitrary classical wire-
tap channel. The optimization is over Markov chains
U ↔ X ↔ Y Z, where U is known as an auxiliary ran-
dom variable. Interestingly, this formula provides the
insight that noise at the encoder (the channel from X to
U) can increase private capacity, with the reasoning being
that, even though it decreases both informations I(U ;Y )
and I(U ;Z), it can happen that it decreases the wiretap-
per’s information I(U ;Z) by more, so that there can be a
noise benefit. The main reason why the classical wiretap
channel model has not been embraced by the classical
cryptography community is that the model assumes that
the channel to the eavesdropper is known, and this is
too much to assume in practice. Interestingly, it would
be some years before the compound wiretap channel and
source were defined.
The source model for secret key agreement was intro-
duced by [AC93]. In this model, two legitimate parties
have access to respective random variables X and Y and
an eavesdropper has access to a random variable Z de-
scribed by the joint probability distribution pXY Z , and
the legitimate parties are allowed public classical commu-
nication. All parties know the distribution pXY Z . If pub-
lic classical communication is allowed only in one round
from X to Y , then the secret key agreement capacity is
given by the formula [AC93]
max
pUV |X
[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)] . (251)
In independent work, it was shown that public communi-
cation can enhance the secret key agreement capacity of
a wiretap channel [Mau93], and an upper bound on the
secret key agreement capacity was established in the case
that arbitrary public classical communication is allowed.
The notion of a collective attack in quantum key dis-
tribution was proposed by [BM97, BBB+02]. Since then,
it has been studied intensively in quantum key distri-
bution [SBPC+09, Lu¨t14, DLQY16, XMZ+19]. Quan-
tum de Finetti theorems and their variants were proved
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[Ren05, CKR09], which demonstrate that general coher-
ent (arbitrary) attacks are no better than collective at-
tacks in the limit of large blocklength. Quantum de
Finetti theorems thus establish the significance of focus-
ing on collective attacks in the context of quantum key
distribution.
The quantum wiretap channel was proposed and stud-
ied in [Dev05, CWY04]. In this model, the wiretap chan-
nel is given by x → ρxBE , with the sender having access
to the input, the legitimate receiver to the quantum sys-
tem B, and the eavesdropper to the quantum system E.
It is assumed that the full channel is known to both the
sender and legitimate receiver. An important result from
[Dev05, CWY04] is that
max
U↔X
[I(U ;B)− I(U ;E)] (252)
is an achievable rate at which they can communicate pri-
vately, paralleling the formula in (250) for the classical
case. It is not known whether this achievable rate is
optimal in general. That is, it is an open problem to
determine the private capacity of the classical–quantum
wiretap channel in the general case.
The quantum wiretap source was proposed and stud-
ied in [DW05]. The model is that Alice, Bob, and Eve
share a state of the form
∑
x p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxBE , and the
goal is to use many copies of this state along with public
classical communication in order to distill a secret key.
The authors of [DW05] found that the rate
I(X;B)− I(X;E) (253)
is achievable for key distillation using many copies of the
aforementioned state. It is important to stress that, in
this model, it is assumed that Alice and Bob have full
knowledge of the state, including the state of the eaves-
dropper. For this reason, it is not justified to apply the
formula in (253) generally when analyzing the security of
quantum key distribution against collective attacks. In
the special case that the quantum key distribution pro-
tocol involves preparations and measurements that are
tomographically complete, the legitimate parties deter-
mine the state of the eavesdropper up to an information-
theoretically irrelevant isometry, and it is then justified
to apply the formula in (253) for security against collec-
tive attacks.
The classical compound wiretap channel was proposed
and studied in [LKPS09] and studied further in [BBS13]
(see also [SBP15] for a review). The model is that the
actual wiretap channel is chosen from an uncertainty set
{psY Z|X}s, it is the same over a large blocklength (used in
an i.i.d. way), and the goal is to be able to communicate
privately regardless of which channel is selected. One
critical result of [LKPS09] is that the following formula
is an achievable rate for private communication in this
setting, when the uncertainty set is finite:
max
U↔X↔YsZs
[
min
s
I(U ;Ys)−max
s
I(U ;Zs)
]
. (254)
The classical compound wiretap channel model is more
acceptable from a cryptographic perspective than is the
standard wiretap channel model, because it allows for
uncertainty in the channel to the wiretapper. However, it
is still difficult to argue that anything about the channel
to the wiretapper would be known in a fully classical
context.
The classical compound wiretap source was consid-
ered in [BW13] and further studied in [TBS17]. The
special case of a classical compound source with one
fixed marginal was considered previously in [Blo10]. The
model from [BW13, TBS17] is that two legitimate par-
ties and an eavesdropper share a source chosen from an
uncertainty set {psXY Z}s, and they are allowed public
classical communication to assist in the task of distilling
a secret key. In [TBS17], a formula for the achievable
distillable secret key was given, and we refer to [TBS17]
for the details. In the special case that the marginals X
and Y are fixed, the results of [Blo10, TBS17] imply that
the rate
I(X;Y )−max
s
I(X;Z) (255)
is achievable for key distillation.
The compound quantum wiretap source was proposed
and studied in [BJ16]. The model studied there is that
the legitimate parties and the eavesdropper share a state
ρsXBE =
∑
x p
s(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx,sBE selected from an uncer-
tainty set {ρsXBE}s, and the goal is to use one round of
forward public classical communication from X to B in
order to distill a secret key. In [BJ16], a formula for the
achievable distillable secret key was given, and we refer
to [BJ16] for the details. In the special case that the
marginals X and B are fixed, the results of [BJ16] imply
that the rate
I(X;B)−max
s
I(X;E) (256)
is achievable. An even further special case is when the
B system is classical. Thus, the results of [BJ16] can
be used to analyze the security of quantum key distribu-
tion against collective attacks. This model is acceptable
from a cryptographic setting because one can determine
the uncertainty set for the state of the eavesdropper dur-
ing the parameter estimation round of a quantum key
distribution protocol. This is possible under the assump-
tion that the eavesdropper is constrained by the laws of
quantum mechanics and due to the structure of quantum
mechanics. One of the contributions of our paper is to
extend these results (with fixed marginal on X and B) to
a second-order coding rate and have the formula apply
to infinite-dimensional systems of interest in continuous-
variable quantum key distribution.
The compound quantum wiretap channel was pre-
sented in [DH10, BCCD14]. In [DH10], the model is that
the wiretap channel is selected from an uncertainty set
x→ ρx,sBE , indexed by s, the channel is the same over the
whole blocklength (used in an i.i.d. way), and the goal
is to communicate privately to the legitimate receiver B
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regardless of which channel is selected from the set. It is
unclear whether the claims of [DH10] hold as generally
as stated therein, but in the case that public shared ran-
domness is available to the legitimate parties, then the
claims of [DH10] appear to hold. The main issue with
the claims of [DH10] is that the code is derandomized,
and when this is done, it is no longer the case that the
code is secure against all of the possible states of the ad-
versaries, as claimed therein. One would need to apply
a union bound argument, as is done in [BCCD14, Sec-
tion IV]. However, this issue does not arise if the code is
not derandomized (in the case that the legitimate parties
have public shared randomness). The coding scheme of
[DH10] is universal in the sense that all that is required
for communication is a lower bound on the Holevo infor-
mation with the legitimate receiver and an upper bound
on the Holevo information with the wiretapper. The pa-
per [BCCD14] considered the same model, but with the
uncertainty set being known and finite. They found that
the following rate is achievable for private communication
in this setting:
max
U↔X↔BsEs
[
min
s
I(U ;Bs)−max
s
I(U ;Es)
]
, (257)
representing a quantum generalization of the main result
of [LKPS09].
Going forward from here, it would be interesting to
develop the compound wiretap channel and source in
more detail, in order to extend the scope of the results
and given the applicability to key distillation in quan-
tum key distribution. This is one contribution of the
present paper, since we have established second-order
coding rates for compound wiretap channels and sources
for infinite-dimensional quantum systems when there is a
fixed marginal. Furthermore, the quantum key distribu-
tion application is well motivated from a cryptographic
perspective, given that it is possible to constrain the pos-
sible states (uncertainty set) of an eavesdropper who op-
erates according to the laws of quantum mechanics. This
is a critical difference with the classical compound wire-
tap channel, in which it is not possible to do so.
A. Remarks on the Devetak–Winter formula and
security against collective attacks
We now comment briefly on the use of the Devetak–
Winter argument in the context of collective attacks in
quantum key distribution. The formula in (256) has
been consistently employed by the quantum key distri-
bution community as an achievable rate for distillable
key against collective attacks. This formula is indeed
correct. However, as discussed above, the argument of
[DW05] did not justify this formula. Instead, it argued
for the achievability of (256) when there is a known col-
lective attack, which is applicable in the case that the
preparation and measurement procedure in a QKD pro-
tocol is tomographically complete. Specifically, one can
analyze the proof of [DW05, Theorem 2.1] to see that
the key distillation scheme constructed ends up depend-
ing on the state shared by all three parties and security
is only guaranteed in this case. From what we can tell,
the formula in (256) was first proven by [RGK05] for the
qubit case and then in [Ren05, Corollary 6.5.2] for general
finite-dimensional states. The latter case has also been
considered in [BJ16]. For infinite-dimensional states, the
present paper has established a proof that the formula in
(256) is achievable.
VII. OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we briefly list some other consequences
of our work. First, the task of entanglement-assisted pri-
vate communication over a broadcast channel was con-
sidered recently in [QSW18]. The technique behind the
proof of Theorem 3 applies to this setting, allowing for
protection against a quantum wiretap channel with fixed
marginal to the decoding set. The result also applies to
the infinite-dimensional case (separable Hilbert spaces).
We can also combine the techniques from Theorem 3
with those in [AJW19a, Theorem 1] and [Sen18, Corol-
lary 2] to find achievable rates for one-shot private com-
munication over a compound wiretap channel with a fi-
nite uncertainty set, when the sender and receiver pos-
sess public shared randomness. These results can then
be extended to second-order coding rates, and they also
hold for the infinite-dimensional case (separable Hilbert
spaces).
Our results lead to achievable second-order cod-
ing rates for classical communication over single-mode
bosonic channels, when assisted by randomness, and thus
extend the findings of [WRG16, OMW19]. Our results
also lead to achievable second-order coding rates for pri-
vate classical communication over the same channels,
when assisted by public shared randomness, thus gen-
eralizing the findings of [Wil17a].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have pushed the security analy-
sis of quantum key distribution forward, by employing
a second-order analysis to bridge the gap between the
asymptotic and non-asymptotic regimes. The technical
contributions that allowed for this advance are a coding
theorem for one-shot key distillation from a compound
quantum wiretap source with fixed marginal, as well as
the establishment of the second-order asymptotics for the
smooth max-relative entropy. Another contribution is a
coding theorem for private communication over a com-
pound quantum wiretap channel with fixed marginal. We
also showed how to optimize the second-order coding rate
for several exemplary QKD protocols, including six-state,
BB84, and continuous-variable QKD. In Section VII, we
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briefly mentioned several other immediate applications of
our technical results.
Going forward from here, an important open problem
is to provide a full second-order analysis of both the pa-
rameter estimation and key distillation steps of a quan-
tum key distribution protocol. At the moment, we have
exclusively analyzed second-order coding rates for the
key distillation step, under the assumption that the pa-
rameter estimation step provides reliable estimates. It
seems plausible to incorporate the latest developments
from [Hay19], in combination with the methods of this
paper, in order to have a complete second-order analysis
of both parameter estimation and key distillation.
Another practical concern is to reduce the amount of
public shared randomness that the protocol from Theo-
rem 3 employs. Likewise, it would be ideal to reduce the
amount of public classical communication used by the
protocol from Theorem 5. Even though these resources
are typically considered essentially free in a private com-
munication setting, it would still be ideal to minimize
their consumption. We note here that this large usage of
a free resource is typical of the methods of position-based
coding [AJW19b] and convex splitting [ADJ17], which
seems to be the cost for obtaining such simple formulas
in the one-shot case. Recent work in other domains has
shown how to reduce the amount of free resource that
these kinds of protocols consume [Ans18].
We think it would also be interesting to consider secret
key distillation in the setting of private communication
per unit cost from [DPW19]. It seems likely that the key
distillation protocol given in Theorem 5 could be helpful
for this task.
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Appendix A: Mutual and Holevo informations and
variances for six-state and BB84 protocols
When Alice and Bob discard their basis information in
the six-state or BB84 protocols, then their classical data
can be described via the following quantum channel:
NA→B(ρA) = p1ρA+p2ZρAZ+p3XρAX+p4Y ρY, (A1)
where p1, p2, p3, p4 ≥ 0, p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, and there
are further constraints on p1, p2, p3, p4.
For the six-state protocol,
p1 = 1− 3Q
2
, (A2)
p2 = p3 = p4 =
Q
2
, (A3)
Q =
1
3
(Qx +Qy +Qz). (A4)
For these values of p1, p2, p3, p4, we obtain
pXY (0, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A5)
=
1
2
(1−Q), (A6)
pXY (0, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A7)
=
1
2
Q, (A8)
pXY (1, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A9)
=
1
2
Q, (A10)
pXY (1, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A11)
=
1
2
(1−Q), (A12)
which is consistent with the probability distribution
p
6-state|sift
X2Y2
in (109)–(112).
For the BB84 protocol,
p1 = 1− 2Q+ s, (A13)
p2 = Q− s, (A14)
p3 = Q− s, (A15)
p4 = s, (A16)
Q =
1
2
(Qx +Qz), (A17)
s = Q− Qy
2
, (A18)
where s ∈ [0, Q] is a parameter to be optimized. Indeed,
for these values of p1, p2, p3, p4,
pXY (0, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A19)
=
1
2
(1−Q), (A20)
pXY (0, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A21)
=
1
2
Q, (A22)
pXY (1, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A23)
=
1
2
Q, (A24)
pXY (1, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A25)
=
1
2
(1−Q), (A26)
which is consistent with the probability distribution
p
BB84|sift
X2Y2
in (128)–(131).
In general,
pXY (0, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A27)
=
1
2
(p1 + p2), (A28)
pXY (0, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|0〉〈0|A)] (A29)
=
1
2
(p3 + p4), (A30)
pXY (1, 0) :=
1
2
Tr[|0〉〈0|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A31)
=
1
2
(p3 + p4), (A32)
pXY (1, 1) :=
1
2
Tr[|1〉〈1|BNA→B(|1〉〈1|A)] (A33)
=
1
2
(p1 + p2). (A34)
Then,
ρXY =
1
2
(p1 + p2)|0, 0〉〈0, 0|+ 1
2
(p3 + p4)|0, 1〉〈0, 1|
+
1
2
(p3 + p4)|1, 0〉〈1, 0|
+
1
2
(p1 + p2)|1, 1〉〈1, 1|. (A35)
It is straightforward to show that
I(X;Y )ρ = 1 + (p1 + p2) log2(p1 + p2)
+ (p3 + p4) log2(p3 + p4) (A36)
= 1− h2(p1 + p2), (A37)
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where h2 is the binary entropy function.
Let us now calculate V (X;Y )ρ. Recall that
V (ρ‖σ) := Tr[ρ(log2 ρ− log2 σ)2]−D(ρ‖σ)2, (A38)
and
V (X;Y )ρ := V (ρXY ‖ρX ⊗ ρY ) (A39)
= Tr[ρXY (log2 ρXY − log2(ρX ⊗ ρY ))2]
− I(X;Y )2ρ. (A40)
One can show that
Tr[ρXY (log2 ρXY − log2(ρX ⊗ ρY ))2]
= (p1 + p2) (1 + log2(p1 + p2))
2
+ (p3 + p4) (1 + log2(p3 + p4))
2
, (A41)
from which it follows that
V (X;Y )ρ = (p1 + p2)(p3 + p4)
(
log2
(
p1 + p2
p3 + p4
))2
.
(A42)
We now calculate I(X;E) and V (X;E). We consider
the following purification of the Choi state of the channel
in (A1):
|ψ〉ABE := √p1|Φ+〉AB |0, 0〉E +√p2|Φ−〉AB |1, 1〉E
+
√
p3|Ψ+〉AB |0, 1〉E +√p4|Ψ−〉AB |1, 0〉E . (A43)
Now,
(〈0|A ⊗ IBE)|ψ〉ABE
= |0〉B 1√
2
(
√
p1|0, 0〉E +√p2|1, 1〉E)
+ |1〉B 1√
2
(
√
p3|0, 1〉E +√p4|1, 0〉E), (A44)
(〈1|A ⊗ IBE)|ψ〉ABE
= |1〉B 1√
2
(
√
p1|0, 0〉E −√p2|1, 1〉E)
+ |0〉B 1√
2
(
√
p3|0, 1〉E −√p4|1, 0〉E). (A45)
Using this, we obtain
ρXE =
1
2
|0〉〈0|X ⊗ ρE|X=0 + 1
2
|1〉〈1|X ⊗ ρE|X=1 (A46)
=

p1
2 0 0
√
p1p2
2 0 0 0 0
0 p32
√
p3p4
2 0 0 0 0 0
0
√
p3p4
2
p4
2 0 0 0 0 0√
p1p2
2 0 0
p2
2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 p12 0 0 −
√
p1p2
2
0 0 0 0 0 p32 −
√
p3p4
2 0
0 0 0 0 0 −
√
p3p4
2
p4
2 0
0 0 0 0 −
√
p1p2
2 0 0
p2
2

. (A47)
The state ρXE can be diagonalized as follows:
ρXE =
(
p1 + p2
2
)
|0〉〈0|X ⊗ |Φ+p1,p2〉〈Φ+p1,p2 |
+
(
p1 + p2
2
)
|1〉〈1|X ⊗ |Φ−p1,p2〉〈Φ−p1,p2 |
+
(
p3 + p4
2
)
|0〉〈0|X ⊗ |Ψ+p3,p4〉〈Ψ+p3,p4 |
+
(
p3 + p4
2
)
|1〉〈1|X ⊗ |Ψ−p3,p4〉〈Ψ−p3,p4 |, (A48)
where
|Φ±p1,p2〉 :=
1√
p1+p2
2
(√
p1
2
|0, 0〉 ±
√
p2
2
|1, 1〉
)
, (A49)
|Ψ±p3,p4〉 :=
1√
p3+p4
2
(√
p3
2
|0, 1〉 ±
√
p4
2
|1, 0〉
)
. (A50)
Then, by observing that
ρE := TrX [ρXE ] = p1|0, 0〉〈0, 0|+ p3|0, 1〉〈0, 1|
+ p4|1, 0〉〈1, 0|+ p2|1, 1〉〈1, 1|, (A51)
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we find that
I(X;E) = H(~p)− h2(p1 + p2), (A52)
where
H(~p) :=
4∑
i=1
−pi log2 pi. (A53)
Finally, for V (X;E), it is straightforward to show that
Tr[ρXE(log2 ρXE − log2(ρX ⊗ ρE))2]
= p1
(
log2
(
p1
p1 + p2
))2
+ p2
(
log2
(
p2
p1 + p2
))2
+ p3
(
log2
(
p3
p3 + p4
))2
+ p4
(
log2
(
p4
p3 + p4
))2
,
(A54)
from which it follows that
V (X;E) = p1
(
log2
(
p1
p1 + p2
))2
+ p2
(
log2
(
p2
p1 + p2
))2
+ p3
(
log2
(
p3
p3 + p4
))2
+ p4
(
log2
(
p4
p3 + p4
))2
− (H(~p)− h2(p1 + p2))2.
(A55)
For the six-state protocol, by using the formulas above
and (A2)–(A4), we obtain
I(X;Y )ρ = 1− h2(Q), (A56)
V (X;Y )ρ = Q(1−Q)
(
log2
(
1−Q
Q
))2
, (A57)
I(X;E)ρ = −
(
1− 3Q
2
)
log2
(
1− 3Q
2
)
− 3Q
2
log2
(
Q
2
)
− h2(Q), (A58)
V (X;E)ρ = Q+
(
1− 3Q
2
)(
log2
(
1− 3Q2
1−Q
))2
+
Q
2
(
log2
(
Q
2
1−Q
))2
− I(X;E)2ρ.
(A59)
The key rate is then
K6-state(Q,n, εI, εII) = 1 +
(
1− 3Q
2
)
log2
(
1− 3Q
2
)
+
3Q
2
log2
(
Q
2
)
+
√
Q(1−Q)
n
log2
(
1−Q
Q
)
Φ−1(εI)
+
√
V (X;E)ρ
n
Φ−1(εII). (A60)
For the BB84 protocol, by using the formulas above
and (A13)–(A18), we obtain
I(X;Y )ρ = 1− h2(Q), (A61)
V (X;Y )ρ = Q(1−Q)
(
log2
(
1−Q
Q
))2
, (A62)
I(X;E)ρ = H({1− 2Q+ s,Q− s,Q− s, s})
− h2(Q), (A63)
V (X;E)ρ = (1− 2Q+ s)
(
log2
(
1− 2Q+ s
1−Q
))2
+ (Q− s)
(
log2
(
Q− s
1−Q
))2
+ (Q− s)
(
log2
(
Q− s
Q
))2
+ s
(
log2
(
s
Q
))2
− I(X;E)2ρ. (A64)
Appendix B: Relation between smooth max-mutual
informations
Here we prove the following lemma relating two differ-
ent variants of smooth max-mutual information:
Lemma 6 Let ρAE be a bipartite state acting on a sep-
arable Hilbert space HA ⊗ HE, and let ε, δ > 0 be such
that ε+ δ < 1. Then
I˜ε+δmax(E;A)ρ ≤ Dεmax(ρAE‖ρA ⊗ ρE) + log2
(
8
δ2
)
, (B1)
where I˜ε+δmax(E;A)ρ is defined in (191) and
Dεmax(ρAE‖ρA ⊗ ρE) in (190).
Proof. The proof follows the proof of [ABJT18, Theo-
rem 2], but has some differences because it is not neces-
sary in our case to ensure partial smoothing. Let ρ˜AE be
a state satisfying P (ρ˜AE , ρAE) ≤ ε. Let γ = δ2/8, and
set ΠγA to be the projection onto the positive eigenspace
of 1γ ρ˜A − ρA. Then it follows that
ΠγA
(
1
γ
ρ˜A − ρA
)
ΠγA ≥ 0
⇒ ΠγAρAΠγA ≤
1
γ
ΠγAρ˜AΠ
γ
A =
8
δ2
ΠγAρ˜AΠ
γ
A, (B2)
and
(I −ΠγA)
(
1
γ
ρ˜A − ρA
)
(I −ΠγA) ≤ 0
⇒ Tr[(I −ΠγA) ρ˜A] ≤ γ Tr[(I −ΠγA) ρA] ≤ γ =
δ2
8
,
(B3)
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where the last inequality follows because
Tr[(I −ΠγA) ρA] ≤ 1. The inequality in (B3) can
be rewritten as
Tr[ΠγAρ˜A] ≥ 1−
δ2
8
. (B4)
Let us define the following states:
ρAEX := Π
γ
Aρ˜AEΠ
γ
A ⊗ |0〉〈0|X
+ (I −ΠγA) ρ˜AE (I −ΠγA)⊗ |1〉〈1|X , (B5)
ρ̂AEX :=(
ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A + ρ˜
1/2
A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE
)
⊗ |0〉〈0|X ,
(B6)
so that
ρ̂AE = TrX [ρ̂AEX ] (B7)
= ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A + ρ˜
1/2
A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE . (B8)
Then, using the inequality ρ˜AE ≤ µρA ⊗ ρE , with
µ := 2Dmax(ρ˜AE‖ρA⊗ρE), (B9)
and the fact that µ 8δ2 ≥ 1 (which holds because
Dmax(ρ˜AE‖ρA ⊗ ρE) ≥ 0 and 8 ≥ δ2), we find that
ρ̂AE ≤ µΠγAρAΠγA ⊗ ρE + ρ˜1/2A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE
≤ µ 8
δ2
ΠγAρ˜AΠ
γ
A ⊗ ρE + ρ˜1/2A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE
≤ µ 8
δ2
[
ΠγAρ˜AΠ
γ
A ⊗ ρE + ρ˜1/2A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE
]
= µ
8
δ2
[
ΠγAρ˜AΠ
γ
A + ρ˜
1/2
A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A
]
⊗ ρE
= µ
8
δ2
ρ̂A ⊗ ρE . (B10)
The second inequality above follows from (B2). Applying
the definition of Dmax(ρ̂AE‖ρ̂A ⊗ ρE), we conclude that
Dmax(ρ̂AE‖ρ̂A ⊗ ρE) ≤
Dmax(ρ˜AE‖ρA ⊗ ρE) + log2
(
8
δ2
)
. (B11)
We can conclude the statement of the lemma if
P (ρ̂AE , ρAE) ≤ ε + δ, and so it is our aim to show this
now. Consider that
P (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX) =
√
1− F (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX). (B12)
The following chain of inequalities holds√
F (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX)
= Tr
[(√
ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
Aρ̂AE
√
ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A
)1/2]
≥ Tr
[(√
ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A (Π
γ
Aρ˜AEΠ
γ
A)
√
ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A
)1/2]
= Tr [ΠγAρ˜AEΠ
γ
A]
= Tr[ΠγAρ˜A]
≥ 1− δ
2
8
, (B13)
where the inequality follows from operator monotonicity
of the square root and the fact that
ρ̂AE = Π
γ
Aρ˜AEΠ
γ
A + ρ˜
1/2
A (I −ΠγA) ρ˜1/2A ⊗ ρE (B14)
≥ ΠγAρ˜AEΠγA (B15)
From the above and (B4), we conclude that
F (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX) ≥ 1− δ
2
4 , which implies that
P (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX) ≤
δ
2
. (B16)
Now consider that
P (ρAEX , ρAE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X)
≤ P (ρAEX , ρ˜AE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X)
+ P (ρ˜AE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X , ρAE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X)
=
√
1− F (ρAEX , ρ˜AE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X) + P (ρ˜AE , ρAE)
=
√
1−
∥∥∥∥√ΠγAρ˜AEΠγA√ρ˜AE∥∥∥∥2
1
+ P (ρ˜AE , ρAE)
=
√
1−
∥∥∥∥√ΠγAρ˜AEΠγA√ΠγAρ˜AEΠγA∥∥∥∥2
1
+ P (ρ˜AE , ρAE)
=
√
1− (Tr[ΠγAρ˜AE ])2 + P (ρ˜AE , ρAE)
≤ δ
2
+ ε, (B17)
where we applied the triangle inequality of the sine dis-
tance [Ras02, Ras03, Ras06, GLN05] for the first inequal-
ity and the fact that
∥∥∥√ΠωΠ√τ∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥√ΠωΠ√ΠτΠ∥∥∥
1
for a projector Π and states ω and τ . Combining this
with (B16), we find that
P (ρ̂AE , ρAE)
= P (ρ̂AEX , ρAE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X) (B18)
≤ P (ρ̂AEX , ρAEX) + P (ρAEX , ρAE ⊗ |0〉〈0|X) (B19)
= ε+ δ. (B20)
Since we have found a state ρ̂AE satisfying
P (ρ̂AE , ρAE) ≤ ε+ δ and (B11), we conclude that
I˜ε+δmax(E;A)ρ ≤ Dmax(ρ˜AE‖ρA⊗ρE)+log2
(
8
δ2
)
. (B21)
Since this inequality has been shown for all states ρ˜AE
satisfying P (ρ˜AE , ρAE) ≤ ε, we conclude the statement
of the lemma.
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Appendix C: Smooth universal convex split lemma
for states acting on a separable Hilbert space
Here we prove a smooth universal convex split lemma
for states acting on a separable Hilbert space:
Lemma 7 (Smooth universal convex split) Let S
be a set, and let ρsAE be a state acting on a separable
Hilbert space HA ⊗HE, such that TrE [ρsAE ] = ρA for all
s ∈ S. Let τsA1···ARE denote the following state:
τsA1···ARE :=
1
R
R∑
r=1
ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAr−1 ⊗ ρsArE ⊗ ρAr+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR .
(C1)
Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0,√ε). If
log2R ≥ sup
s∈S
I˜
√
ε−η
max (E;A)ρs + 2 log2
(
1
2η
)
, (C2)
then for all s ∈ S, there exists a state ρ˜sE satisfying
1
2
∥∥τsA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ √ε, (C3)
and P (ρ˜sE , ρ
s
E) ≤
√
ε− η.
Proof. Fix s ∈ S. Let ρ˜sAE be an arbitrary state satis-
fying P (ρ˜sAE , ρ
s
AE) ≤
√
ε− η and is such that
ρsA ⊗ ρ˜sE = pρ˜sAE + (1− p)ωsAE , (C4)
for some p ∈ (0, 1) and ωsAE some state. We define the
following state, which we think of as an approximation
to τsA1···ARE :
τ˜sA1···ARE :=
1
R
R∑
r=1
ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAr−1 ⊗ ρ˜sArE ⊗ ρAr+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR .
(C5)
It is a good approximation if
√
ε− η is small, because
√
F (τsA1···ARE , τ˜
s
A1···ARE)
≥ 1
R
R∑
r=1
√
F (ρ⊗r−1A ⊗ ρsArE ⊗ ρ⊗R−rA ,
ρ⊗r−1A ⊗ ρ˜sArE ⊗ ρ⊗R−rA ) (C6)
=
1
R
R∑
r=1
√
F (ρsArE , ρ˜
s
ArE) (C7)
=
√
F (ρsArE , ρ˜
s
ArE), (C8)
which in turn implies that
√
F (τsA1···ARE , τ˜
s
A1···ARE) ≥
√
F (ρsArE , ρ˜
s
ArE). (C9)
So the inequality in (C9), the definition of the sine dis-
tance, and the fact that P (ρ˜sAE , ρ
s
AE) ≤
√
ε − η, imply
that
P (τsA1···ARE , τ˜
s
A1···ARE) ≤
√
ε− η, (C10)
and in turn that
1
2
∥∥τsA1···ARE − τ˜sA1···ARE∥∥1 ≤ √ε− η. (C11)
Now, following [LW19, Appendix A] closely, let us define
the following states:
βsAE := ρ
s
A ⊗ ρ˜sE , (C12)
αsAE := ρ˜
s
AE , (C13)
τ˜sARER :=
1
R
R∑
r=1
βA1E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ βAr−1Er−1 ⊗ αsArEr⊗
βsAr+1Er+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ βARER , (C14)
and observe that
TrER2 [(β
s
AE)
⊗R] = ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE , (C15)
TrER2 [τ˜
s
ARER ] = τ˜
s
A1···ARE . (C16)
Thus, it follows from data processing of normalized trace
distance that
1
2
∥∥τ˜sA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1
≤ 1
2
∥∥τ˜sARER − (βsAE)⊗R∥∥1 . (C17)
Now applying [LW19, Lemma 15], we find that
1
2
∥∥τ˜sA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ η (C18)
if
log2R ≥ log2(1/p) + 2 log2
(
1
2η
)
. (C19)
For the same choice of R, it follows from (C17) that
1
2
∥∥τ˜sA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ η. (C20)
Applying the triangle inequality to (C11) and (C20), we
find that
1
2
∥∥τsA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ √ε. (C21)
The whole argument above holds for an arbitrary state
ρ˜sAE satisfying P (ρ˜
s
AE , ρ
s
AE) ≤
√
ε − η and (C4), and so
taking an infimum of log2(1/p) over all states satisfying
these conditions, and applying the definition in (191), as
well as (186), we find that
1
2
∥∥τsA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ √ε (C22)
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if
log2R ≥ I˜
√
ε−η
max (E;A)ρs + 2 log2
(
1
2η
)
. (C23)
Now note that the whole argument holds for all s ∈ S,
due to the uniform structure of the convex split method,
which consists of bringing in a tensor-power state and
performing a random permutation. We then find that
1
2
∥∥τsA1···ARE − ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAR ⊗ ρ˜sE∥∥1 ≤ √ε (C24)
for all s ∈ S if
log2R ≥ sup
s∈S
I˜
√
ε−η
max (E;A)ρs + 2 log2
(
1
2η
)
. (C25)
This concludes the proof.
Appendix D: Duality of smooth max-relative
entropy
This appendix generalizes a duality relation for smooth
max-relative entropy from the finite-dimensional case
[JN12] to the case of states acting on a separable Hilbert
space. Recall that the smooth max-relative entropy is
defined as
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) = log2 inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
inf
λ≥0
{λ : ρ˜ ≤ λσ} . (D1)
We can also define the dual smooth max-relative entropy
as
D̂εmax(ρ‖σ) := log2 sup
M≥0
inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
{Tr[Mρ˜] : Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1} ,
(D2)
where the supremum is with respect to all compact
bounded operators M ≥ 0, as these are dual to the
trace-class operators [RS78]. In this section, for both
of the above quantities, we expand the definitions to
allow for subnormalized states ρ and σ (i.e., such that
Tr[ρ],Tr[σ] ≤ 1) and the sine distance becomes as fol-
lows [Tom15]:
P (τ, ω) :=
√
1− F (τ ⊕ (1− Tr[τ ]) , ω ⊕ (1− Tr[ω])).
(D3)
In what follows, we call subnormalized states “substates”
for short. Note that for any projection Π and substates
τ and ω, the following inequality holds [Tom15]
P (ΠτΠ,ΠωΠ) ≤ P (τ, ω). (D4)
Lemma 8 Let ρ and σ be states acting on a separa-
ble Hilbert space H. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and suppose that
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) <∞. Then
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) = D̂εmax(ρ‖σ). (D5)
Proof. We prove this in several steps, with the proof
bearing some similarities to the approach from [FAR11,
Appendix B] (see also [WW18, Appendix A] in this con-
text). First, for states ρ˜ and σ, consider from weak du-
ality that
inf
λ≥0
{λ : ρ˜ ≤ λσ} ≥ sup
M≥0
{Tr[Mρ˜] : Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1} , (D6)
where the optimization on the right-hand side is over the
compact bounded operators, given that these are dual
to the trace-class operators [RS78]. In more detail, let
λ ≥ 0 satisfy ρ˜ ≤ λσ, and let M be an arbitrary compact
bounded operator satisfying M ≥ 0 and Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1.
Then it follows that λ ≥ λTr[Mσ] ≥ Tr[Mρ˜], where we
used ρ˜ ≤ λσ and M ≥ 0. Since this inequality holds for
all λ and M satisfying the given conditions, we conclude
the weak duality inequality in (D6). Then we have that
Dεmax(ρ‖σ)
= log2 inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
inf
λ≥0
{λ : ρ˜ ≤ λσ} (D7)
≥ log2 inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
sup
M≥0
{Tr[Mρ˜] : Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1} (D8)
≥ log2 sup
M≥0
inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
{Tr[Mρ˜] : Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1} (D9)
= D̂εmax(ρ‖σ). (D10)
So the following weak-duality inequality holds
Dεmax(ρ‖σ) ≥ D̂εmax(ρ‖σ). (D11)
Let {Πk}k be a sequence of projectors onto finite-
dimensional subspaces strongly converging to the iden-
tity operator, and suppose that Πk ≤ Πk′ for k ≤ k′.
Then define
ρk := ΠkρΠk, σk := ΠkσΠk. (D12)
We now prove that
lim
k→∞
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) = Dεmax(ρ‖σ). (D13)
Let ρ˜ be an arbitrary state satisfying P (ρ˜, ρ) ≤ ε and let
λ satisfy ρ˜ ≤ λσ. Then it follows that
ρ˜k := Πkρ˜Πk ≤ λΠkσΠk = λσk, (D14)
P (ρ˜k, ρk) ≤ ε, (D15)
so that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ log2 λ. (D16)
Since λ and ρ˜ are arbitrary, we conclude that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ Dεmax(ρ‖σ), (D17)
and since this inequality holds for all k, the following
inequality holds
lim sup
k→∞
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ Dεmax(ρ‖σ). (D18)
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To show the opposite inequality, we first prove that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) is monotone non-decreasing with k. (The
proof is in fact similar to what we have just shown.) Fix k
and k′ such that k ≤ k′. Let ρ˜k′ be a substate satisfying
P (ρ˜k
′
, ρk
′
) ≤ ε and let λk′ be such that ρ˜k′ ≤ λk′σk′ .
Then it follows that
ρ˜k
′,k := Πkρ˜k
′
Πk ≤ λk′Πkσk′Πk = λk′σk, (D19)
and
P (ρ˜k
′,k,Πkρk
′
Πk) = P (ρ˜k
′,k, ρk) ≤ ε, (D20)
so that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ log2 λk
′
. (D21)
Since λk
′
and ρ˜k
′
are arbitrary, it follows that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ Dεmax(ρk
′‖σk′). (D22)
Now let ρ˜k and λk be the optimal state and value
for Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk), so that λk = Dεmax(ρk‖σk). By what
we have just shown, the sequence λk is monotone non-
decreasing, and so the limit λ := limk→∞ λk is well de-
fined. Also, we know from (D18) that λ ≤ Dεmax(ρ‖σ) <
∞. Due to the fact that ∥∥ρ˜k∥∥
1
= Tr[ρ˜k] ≤ λk Tr[σk] ≤
λTr[σ], it follows that ρ˜k is a bounded sequence in
the trace-class operators. Since the trace-class opera-
tors form the dual space of the compact bounded op-
erators [RS78], we apply the Banach–Alaoglu theorem
[RS78] to find a subsequence
{
ρ˜k
}
k∈S having a weak*
limit ρ˜, which means that Tr[Kρ˜k] → Tr[Kρ˜] for k ∈ S
and for all compact bounded operators K. It holds
that ρ˜k is positive semi-definite. Then it follows that
λkσk − ρ˜k converges in the weak operator topology to
λσ − ρ˜. Then we conclude that λσ − ρ˜ ≥ 0, and finally
that Dεmax(ρ‖σ) ≤ λ. So we conclude (D13).
By strong duality, and the fact that ρk and σk are
finite-dimensional, it follows from [JN12] that
Dεmax(ρ
k‖σk) = D̂εmax(ρk‖σk) (D23)
for all k. So these equalities and (D13) imply that
lim
k→∞
D̂εmax(ρ
k‖σk) = Dεmax(ρ‖σ). (D24)
Now our goal is to prove that
lim
k→∞
D̂εmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ D̂εmax(ρ‖σ), (D25)
and we adopt a similar approach as above for doing so.
Let Mk be an arbitrary compact bounded operator sat-
isfying Tr[Mkσk] ≤ 1 and let ρ˜ be an arbitrary substate
satisfying P (ρ˜, ρ) ≤ ε. Define ρ˜k = Πkρ˜Πk. Then it
follows that
Tr[Mkσk] = Tr[ΠkMkΠkσ] ≤ 1, (D26)
P (ρ˜k, ρk) ≤ ε, (D27)
and
inf
ρ̂k:P (ρ̂k,ρk)≤ε
Tr[Mkρ̂k] ≤ Tr[Mkρ˜k] (D28)
= Tr[MkΠkρ˜Πk] (D29)
= Tr[ΠkMkΠkρ˜]. (D30)
Since the inequality holds for all ρ˜ satisfying P (ρ˜, ρ) ≤ ε,
we conclude that
inf
ρ̂k:P (ρ̂k,ρk)≤ε
Tr[Mkρ̂k]
≤ inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
Tr[ΠkMkΠkρ˜] (D31)
≤ sup
M≥0
inf
ρ˜:P (ρ˜,ρ)≤ε
{Tr[Mρ˜] : Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1} (D32)
= D̂εmax(ρ‖σ), (D33)
where the second inequality follows because ΠkMkΠk
is a particular compact bounded operator satisfying
Tr[ΠkMkΠkσ] ≤ 1. Since the inequality above has been
shown for an arbitrary compact bounded operator Mk
satisfying Tr[Mkσk] ≤ 1, we conclude that
sup
Mk≥0
inf
ρ̂k:P (ρ̂k,ρk)≤ε
{
Tr[Mkρ̂k] : Tr[Mkσk] ≤ 1}
= D̂εmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ D̂εmax(ρ‖σ). (D34)
Since this inequality has been shown for arbitrary k, we
conclude that
lim sup
k→∞
D̂εmax(ρ
k‖σk) ≤ D̂εmax(ρ‖σ). (D35)
Finally, by combining (D11), (D24), and (D25), we
conclude that
D̂εmax(ρ‖σ) = Dεmax(ρ‖σ). (D36)
This completes the proof.
Appendix E: Relation between smooth max-relative
entropy and hypothesis testing relative entropy
This appendix establishes inequalities relating the
smooth max-relative entropy and the hypothesis testing
relative entropy of states acting on a separable Hilbert
space.
Lemma 9 Let ρ and σ be states acting on a separable
Hilbert space H. Let ε ∈ (0, 1), and set δ ∈ (0, 1) such
that ε+ δ < 1. Suppose that D
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ) <∞. Then the
following bounds hold
D
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ) ≤ D1−εH (ρ‖σ) + log2
(
1
1− ε
)
, (E1)
D1−ε−δH (ρ‖σ) ≤ D
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ) + log2
(
4 (1− ε)
δ2
)
. (E2)
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Proof. These bounds were established for the finite-
dimensional case in [ABJT19, Theorem 4]. Here we check
that the arguments presented in the proof of [ABJT19,
Theorem 4] hold for the more general case in the state-
ment of the lemma, and we combine with the result from
Lemma 8.
We first consider the inequality in (E1). Let M ≥ 0
be an arbitrary compact bounded operator satisfying
Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1. SinceM is compact, it has a countable spec-
tral decomposition as M =
∑
imi|φi〉〈φi|, where {mi}i is
a countable set of non-negative eigenvalues and {|φi〉}i is
a countable orthonormal basis. We define a measurement
(or completely dephasing) channel as
M(·) :=
∑
i
|φi〉〈φi|(·)|φi〉〈φi|, (E3)
and we set the probability distributions P and Q such
that
M(ρ) =
∑
i
P (i)|φi〉〈φi|, (E4)
M(σ) =
∑
i
Q(i)|φi〉〈φi|. (E5)
Then the data processing inequality for the hypothesis
testing relative entropy implies that
D1−εH (ρ‖σ) ≥ D1−εH (P‖Q) ≥ D1−εs (P‖Q) := K, (E6)
where the ε-information spectrum relative entropy of
states τ and ω is defined as [TH13]
Dεs(τ‖ω) := sup
{
λ ∈ R : Tr[τ {τ ≤ 2Rω}] ≤ ε} , (E7)
and
{
τ ≤ 2Rω} denotes the projection onto the positive
part of 2Rω − τ . The second inequality above follows by
picking Λ :=
{
τ > 2Rω
}
for R = Dεs(τ‖ω)− ξ for ξ > 0.
Since Λ satisfies Tr[Λτ ] ≥ 1− ε, and we also have that
Tr[Λω] = Tr[
{
τ > 2Rω
}
ω] (E8)
≤ 2−R Tr[τ {τ > 2Rω}] (E9)
≤ 2−R, (E10)
it follows from definitions that
R = Dεs(τ‖ω)− ξ ≤ DεH(τ‖ω). (E11)
Since the inequality has been shown for all ξ > 0, it
follows that Dεs(τ‖ω) ≤ DεH(τ‖ω). Now set η > 0, and
define the set
I :=
{
i : P (i) ≤ 2K+ηQ(i)} , (E12)
which implies that P (I) :=
∑
i∈I P (i) > 1 − ε from the
definition of D1−εs (P‖Q). Now define the projection Π :=∑
i 6∈I |φi〉〈φi|. Then it follows that
Tr[Πρ] = Tr[M(Π)ρ] (E13)
= Tr[ΠM(ρ)] (E14)
= 1− P (I) (E15)
≤ ε. (E16)
Set
ρ˜ :=
(I −Π) ρ (I −Π)
1− Tr[Πρ] . (E17)
Then it follows that P (ρ, ρ˜) ≤ √ε because
F (ρ, ρ˜)
=
∥∥∥√ρ√ρ˜∥∥∥2
1
(E18)
=
1
1− Tr[Πρ]
∥∥∥√ρ√(I −Π) ρ (I −Π)∥∥∥2
1
(E19)
=
1
1− Tr[Πρ]×∥∥∥√(I −Π) ρ (I −Π)√(I −Π) ρ (I −Π)∥∥∥2
1
(E20)
=
1
1− Tr[Πρ] ‖(I −Π) ρ (I −Π)‖
2
1 (E21)
= 1− Tr[Πρ]. (E22)
Then since 1− Tr[Πρ] > 1− ε, it follows that
Tr[Mρ˜] =
1
1− Tr[Πρ] Tr[M (I −Π) ρ (I −Π)] (E23)
=
1
1− Tr[Πρ]
∑
i∈I
miP (i) (E24)
≤ 1
1− ε2
K+η
∑
i∈I
miQ(i) (E25)
≤ 1
1− ε2
K+η
∑
i
miQ(i) (E26)
=
1
1− ε2
K+η Tr[Mσ] (E27)
≤ 1
1− ε2
D1−εH (ρ‖σ)+η. (E28)
Taking a logarithm and an infimum over all states ρ˜ sat-
isfying P (ρ, ρ˜) ≤ √ε, we find that
log2 inf
ρ˜:P (ρ,ρ˜)≤√ε
Tr[Mρ˜]
≤ D1−εH (ρ‖σ) + η + log2
(
1
1− ε
)
. (E29)
Since the inequality has been shown for all compact
bounded operators M ≥ 0 satisfying Tr[Mσ] ≤ 1, it fol-
lows that
D̂
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ) = log2 sup
M≥0
inf
ρ˜:P (ρ,ρ˜)≤√ε
Tr[Mρ˜] (E30)
≤ D1−εH (ρ‖σ) + η + log2
(
1
1− ε
)
. (E31)
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Since the inequality has been shown for all η > 0, it
follows that
D̂
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ) ≤ D1−εH (ρ‖σ) + log2
(
1
1− ε
)
. (E32)
Now applying Lemma 8, we conclude the inequality
in (E1).
We now consider the other inequality in (E2). Let
λ ≥ 0 and ρ˜ be a state satisfying P (ρ˜, ρ) ≤ √ε and
ρ˜ ≤ 2λσ. (E33)
Consider an arbitrary operator Λ satisfying 0 ≤ Λ ≤ I
and Tr[(I − Λ) ρ] = 1− ε− δ. Then the data processing
inequality for the fidelity, with respect to the measure-
ment {Λ, I − Λ}, implies that
√
1− ε
≤
√
F (ρ˜, ρ)
≤
√
Tr[Λρ˜] Tr[Λρ] +
√
Tr[(I − Λ) ρ˜] Tr[(I − Λ) ρ]
≤
√
2λ Tr[Λσ] +
√
1− ε− δ. (E34)
Now taking an infimum over all λ such that (E33) holds
and all Λ satisfying 0 ≤ Λ ≤ I and Tr[(I − Λ) ρ] = 1 −
ε− δ, and applying definitions, we find that
√
1− ε ≤
√
2D
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ)2−D
1−ε−δ
H (ρ‖σ) +
√
1− ε− δ.
(E35)
Rewriting this gives
log2
[√
1− ε−√1− ε− δ
]2
≤ D
√
ε
max(ρ‖σ)−D1−ε−δH (ρ‖σ). (E36)
Now applying the inequality
√
1− ε − √1− ε− δ ≥
δ
2
√
1−ε , we conclude (E2).
Appendix F: Second-order asymptotics of smooth
max-relative entropy for states acting on a separable
Hilbert space
Recall the quantities defined in (244)–(246). We also
define
Φ(a) :=
1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
dx exp
(−x2
2
)
, (F1)
Φ−1(ε) := sup {a ∈ R | Φ(a) ≤ ε} . (F2)
For ε ∈ (0, 1), observe that
Φ−1(1− ε) = −Φ−1(ε). (F3)
Let us define the quantity T (ρ‖σ) [TH13, Li14, KW17]
as
T (ρ‖σ) :=
∑
x,y
|〈φy|ψx〉|2 λx
∣∣∣∣log2(λxµy
)
−D(ρ‖σ)
∣∣∣∣3 ,
(F4)
where the eigendecompositions of the states ρ and σ are
given in (244). Then the following expansion holds for
ρ and σ such that D(ρ‖σ), V (ρ‖σ), T (ρ‖σ) < ∞ and
V (ρ‖σ) > 0:
1
n
DεH(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n) =
D(ρ‖σ) +
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
. (F5)
The equality in (F5) was shown for finite-dimensional
states in [Li14, TH13]. For states acting on a sep-
arable Hilbert space, the inequality ≤ was shown in
[DPR16, KW17], while the inequality ≥ was established
in [Li14, DPR16, OMW19]. The term O
(
logn
n
)
above
hides constants involving V (ρ‖σ), T (ρ‖σ), and ε.
By combining the equality in (F5) with Lemma 9, we
arrive at the following corollary, giving the second-order
asymptotics for smooth max-relative entropy of states
acting on a separable Hilbert space:
Corollary 10 Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Let ρ and σ be
states acting on a separable Hilbert space H, such that
D(ρ‖σ), V (ρ‖σ), T (ρ‖σ) < ∞ and V (ρ‖σ) > 0. Then
the following second-order expansion holds for sufficiently
large n:
1
n
D
√
ε
max(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n) =
D(ρ‖σ)−
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
. (F6)
Proof. Exploiting the inequality in (E1), we find that
1
n
D
√
ε
max(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n)
≤ 1
n
D1−εH (ρ
⊗n‖ρ⊗n) + 1
n
log2
(
1
1− ε
)
(F7)
= D(ρ‖σ) +
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(1− ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
(F8)
= D(ρ‖σ)−
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
. (F9)
where the first equality follows from (F5) and the last
equality follows from (F3). Now exploiting the inequality
in (E2) and choosing δ = 1/
√
n, we find that
1
n
D
√
ε
max(ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n)
≥ 1
n
D1−ε−δH (ρ
⊗n‖σ⊗n)− 1
n
log2
(
4 (1− ε)
δ2
)
= D(ρ‖σ) +
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(1− ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
= D(ρ‖σ)−
√
1
n
V (ρ‖σ)Φ−1(ε) +O
(
log n
n
)
. (F10)
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In the first equality, we have invoked a standard step
from [TH13, Footnote 6] applied to Φ−1(1−ε−δ), which
is an invocation of Taylor’s theorem: for f continuously
differentiable, c a positive constant, and n ≥ n0, the
following equality holds
√
nf(x+ c/
√
n) =
√
nf(x) + cf ′(a) (F11)
for some a ∈ [x, x+ c/√n0]. This concludes the proof.
Appendix G: Mutual information variance and T
quantity of classical–quantum states
Proposition 11 Given is a classical–quantum state of
the following form:
ρXB :=
∑
x
pX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB . (G1)
Suppose that ρxB and ρB :=
∑
x pX(x)ρ
x
B have the follow-
ing spectral decompositions:
ρxB =
∑
y
p(y|x)|ψx,y〉〈ψx,y|B , (G2)
ρB =
∑
z
q(z)|φz〉〈φz|B , (G3)
for p(y|x) a conditional probability distribution,
{|ψx,y〉B}y an orthonormal set of eigenvectors (for
fixed x), q(z) a probability distribution, and {|φz〉B}z an
orthonormal set of eigenvectors. Then
V (X;B)ρ
=
∑
x
pX(x)
(
V (ρxB‖ρB) + [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2
)
− [I(X;B)]2
(G4)
=
∑
x
p(x)
∑
y,z
|〈ψx,y|φz〉B |2 p(y|x) |f(x, y, z)|2 , (G5)
T (X;B)ρ =∑
x
p(x)
∑
y,z
|〈ψx,y|φz〉B |2 p(y|x) |f(x, y, z)|3 , (G6)
where
f(x, y, z) := log2 (p(y|x)/q(z))− I(X;B). (G7)
Proof. To see the first expression in (G4), consider that
log2 ρXB − log2 ρX ⊗ ρB
= log2
[∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ pX(x)ρxB
]
− log2
[∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ pX(x)ρB
]
=
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ (log2 [pX(x)ρxB ]− log2 [pX(x)ρB ])
=
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ (log2 ρxB − log2 ρB) , (G8)
and we find that
[log2 ρXB − log2 ρX ⊗ ρB − I(X;B)]2
=
∑
x
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ (log2 ρxB − log2 ρB − I(X;B))2 , (G9)
so that
Tr[ρXB (log2 ρXB − log2 ρX ⊗ ρB − I(X;B))2]
= Tr
 (∑x′ pX(x′)|x′〉〈x′|X ⊗ ρx′B)×(∑
x |x〉〈x|X ⊗ (log2 ρxB − log2 ρB − I(X;B))2
) 
=
∑
x
pX(x) Tr[ρ
x
B (log2 ρ
x
B − log2 ρB − I(X;B))2]
=
∑
x
pX(x) Tr[ρ
x
B (log2 ρ
x
B − log2 ρB)2]− [I(X;B)]2 .
(G10)
Now consider that
Tr[ρxB (log2 ρ
x
B − log2 ρB)2]
= Tr[ρxB (log2 ρ
x
B − log2 ρB)2]
− [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2 + [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2
= Tr[ρxB (log2 ρ
x
B − log2 ρB −D(ρxB‖ρB))2]
+ [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2
= V (ρxB‖ρB) + [D(ρxB‖ρB)]2 . (G11)
Substituting the last line back in (G10) gives the formula
in (G4).
To see the other expressions, consider that
T (ρXB‖ρX ⊗ ρB)
=
∑
x,x′,y,z
|(〈x|X ⊗ 〈ψx,y|B) (|x′〉X ⊗ |φz〉B)|2 p(x)p(y|x)×
|log2 (p(x)p(y|x)/ [p(x′)q(z)])− I(X;B)|3
(G12)
=
∑
x,y,z
|〈ψx,y|φz〉B |2 p(x)p(y|x) |f(x, y, z)|3 (G13)
=
∑
x
p(x)
∑
y,z
|〈ψx,y|φz〉B |2 p(y|x) |f(x, y, z)|3 . (G14)
By employing a similar development as above, the for-
mula in (G5) is then clear.
Appendix H: Holevo information and Holevo
information variance of a Gaussian ensemble of
Gaussian states
In what follows, we determine formulas for the Holevo
information and Holevo information variance of a Gaus-
sian ensemble of Gaussian states. The first is well known,
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but the expression we give for it seems to be novel. The
latter has not been presented yet to our knowledge. Be-
fore presenting the formulas, we provide a brief review of
quantum Gaussian states in order to set some notation.
We refer to [Ser17] for an in-depth overview of quantum
Gaussian states and measurements.
We consider m-mode Gaussian states, where m is some
fixed positive integer. Let rˆj denote each quadrature op-
erator (2m of them for an m-mode state), and let
rˆ ≡ [xˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , xˆm, pˆm] (H1)
≡ [rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2m] (H2)
denote the vector of quadrature operators, so that the
odd entries correspond to position-quadrature operators
and the even entries to momentum-quadrature operators.
The quadrature operators satisfy the following commu-
tation relations:
[rˆj , rˆk] = iΩj,k, where Ω := Im ⊗
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, (H3)
and Im is the m ×m identity matrix. We also take the
annihilation operator aˆ = (xˆ+ ipˆ) /
√
2.
Let ρ be a Gaussian state, with the mean-vector entries
µj := 〈rˆj〉ρ , (H4)
and let µ denote the mean vector. The entries of the
covariance matrix V of ρ are given by
Vj,k ≡ 〈{rˆj − µj , rˆk − µk}〉ρ , (H5)
and they satisfy the uncertainty principle V + iΩ ≥ 0.
A 2m × 2m matrix S is symplectic if it preserves the
symplectic form: SΩST = Ω. According to Williamson’s
theorem [Wil36], there is a diagonalization of the covari-
ance matrix V of the form,
V = S (D ⊗ I2)ST , (H6)
where S is a symplectic matrix and D ≡ diag(ν1, . . . , νm)
is a diagonal matrix of symplectic eigenvalues such that
νi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We say that a quantum
Gaussian state is faithful if all of its symplectic eigenval-
ues are strictly greater than one (this also means that
the state is positive definite). We can write the density
operator ρ of a faithful state in the following exponential
form [Che05, Kru06, Hol10] (see also [Hol12, Ser17]):
ρ = Z−1/2 exp
[
−1
2
(rˆ − µ)TG(rˆ − µ)
]
, (H7)
with Z := det([V + iΩ] /2) (H8)
and G := −2ΩS [arcoth(D)⊗ I2]STΩ, (H9)
where arcoth(x) ≡ 12 ln
(
x+1
x−1
)
with domain (−∞,−1) ∪
(1,+∞). The matrix G is known as the Hamiltonian
matrix [Ser17]. Note that we can also write
G = 2iΩ arcoth(iV Ω), (H10)
so that G is represented directly in terms of the covari-
ance matrix V . Faithfulness of Gaussian states is re-
quired to ensure that G is non-singular. By inspection,
the Hamiltonian matrix G and the covariance matrix V
are symmetric.
Let µρ, V ρ, Gρ, Zρ denote the various quantities above
for an m-mode quantum Gaussian state ρ, and let µσ,
V σ, Gσ, Zσ denote the various quantities for an m-mode
quantum Gaussian state σ. Then the relative entropy
D(ρ‖σ) is given by the following formula:
D(ρ‖σ) = 1
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
Zσ
Zρ
)
+
1
2
Tr[V ρ∆] + δTGσδ
]
.
(H11)
The formula in (H11) was established by [Che05] for
the zero-mean case, by [Kru06] for the case of non-zero
mean but equal covariance matrices, and then extended
by [Pir17] to the case of general multi-mode Gaussian
states. The relative entropy variance is given by the fol-
lowing formula [WTLB17]:
V (ρ‖σ) = 1
8 ln2 2
[
Tr[(∆V ρ)
2
] + Tr[(∆Ω)
2
]
]
+
1
2 ln2 2
δTGσV ρGσδ, (H12)
where
δ := µρ − µσ, (H13)
∆ := Gσ −Gρ. (H14)
Recall from (41) and (42) that the Holevo information
and Holevo information variance of a general ensemble
{pY (y), ρyE}y are given by the following, with sums re-
placed by integrals:
I(Y ;E) =
∫
dy pY (y)D(ρ
y
E‖ρE), (H15)
V (Y ;E) =
∫
dy pY (y)
[
V (ρyE‖ρE) + (D(ρyE‖ρE))2
]
− [I(Y ;E)]2 , (H16)
where
ρE :=
∫
dy pY (y)ρ
y
E . (H17)
Then the proof of Proposition 2 is as follows:
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall Definition 1 for a Gaus-
sian ensemble of quantum Gaussian states. First, con-
sider that the expected density operator ρE in (H17) is a
quantum Gaussian state because it is a Gaussian mixture
of Gaussian states. Furthermore, the entries µjE of the
mean vector µE of ρE are given by
µjE := Tr[rˆjρE ] (H18)
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr[rˆjρ
y
E ] (H19)
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=
∫
dy pY (y)
(
[Wy]j + νj
)
(H20)
= [Wµ+ ν]j , (H21)
so that
µE = Wµ+ ν. (H22)
The entries V jkE of the covariance matrix VE of ρE are
given by
V jkE := Tr
[{
rˆj − µjE , rˆk − µkE
}
ρE
]
(H23)
= Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρE ]− 2µjE Tr [rˆkρE ]
− 2µkE Tr [rˆjρE ] + 2µjEµkE Tr[ρE ] (H24)
= Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρE ]− 2µjEµkE . (H25)
Let us focus on the first term Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρE ]. Set
yc := y − µ, (H26)
and consider that
Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρE ]
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρyE ] (H27)
=
∫
dy pY (y)
(
V jk + 2 [Wy + ν]j [Wy + ν]k
)
(H28)
= V jk + 2
∫
dy pY (y) [Wy + ν]j [Wy + ν]k (H29)
= V jk + 2
∫
dy pY (y) [Wyc + µE ]j [Wyc + µE ]k ,
(H30)
where the second equality follows from the definition of
the quantum covariance matrix V of ρyE and the fact that
Wy+ν is the mean vector of ρyE . The last equality follows
from (H22) and (H26). Focusing on the second term, we
find that∫
dy pY (y) [Wyc + µE ]j [Wyc + µE ]k
=
∫
dy pY (y)
(
µjE +
∑
`
Wj`y
`
c
)(
µkE +
∑
m
Wkmy
m
c
)
(H31)
= µjEµ
k
E +
∑
`,m
Wj`Wkm
∫
dy pY (y)y
`
cy
m
c (H32)
= µjEµ
k
E +
∑
`,m
Wj`WkmΣ`m (H33)
= µjEµ
k
E +
[
WΣWT
]
jk
, (H34)
where the second equality follows because∫
dy pY (y)
∑
`
Wj`y
`
cµ
k
E = 0, (H35)
with similar reasoning for the other vanishing term. It
follows that
Tr [{rˆj , rˆk} ρE ] = V jk + 2
([
µjEµ
k
E +WΣW
T
]
jk
)
,
(H36)
and we find from combining with (H25) that
V jkE = V
jk + 2
[
WΣWT
]
jk
, (H37)
or equivalently,
VE = V + 2WΣW
T . (H38)
So the expected density operator ρE is a quantum Gaus-
sian state with mean vector given by (H22) and quantum
covariance matrix given by (H38). The normalization ZE
of ρE is thus given by
ZE := det([VE + iΩ] /2), (H39)
and the Hamiltonian matrix GE of ρE is given by
GE := 2iΩ arcoth(iVEΩ). (H40)
Thus, the Holevo information I(Y ;E) works out to
I(Y ;E) (H41)
=
∫
dy pY (y)D(ρ
y
E‖ρE) (H42)
=
∫
dy
pY (y)
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] + δTGEδ
]
(H43)
=
1
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] +
∫
dy pY (y)δ
TGEδ
]
,
(H44)
where
δ := Wy + ν − (Wµ+ ν) = W (y − µ). (H45)
For the equality in (H43), we applied the formula in
(H11). To evaluate the last integral, consider that∫
dy pY (y)δ
TGEδ
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr[δδ
TGE ] (H46)
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr[W (y − µ)(y − µ)TWTGE ] (H47)
= Tr[WΣWTGE ]. (H48)
Then the formula for the Holevo information I(Y ;E) re-
duces to
I(Y ;E) =
1
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] + Tr[WΣWTGE ]
]
,
(H49)
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as claimed.
We now determine a formula for the Holevo informa-
tion variance. We first consider the difference∫
dy pY (y) (D(ρ
y
E‖ρE))2 − [I(Y ;E)]2 . (H50)
Consider from (H43) that
(2 ln 2)
2
[
(D(ρyE‖ρE))2 − [I(Y ;E)]2
]
=
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] + δTGEδ
]2
−
[
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆] + Tr[WΣWTGE ]
]2
(H51)
= 2
(
ln
(
ZE
Z
)
+
1
2
Tr[V∆]
)(
δTGEδ − Tr[WΣWTGE ]
)
+
(
δTGEδ
)2 − (Tr[WΣWTGE ])2 . (H52)
This means that
(2 ln 2)
2
∫
dy pY (y) (D(ρ
y
E‖ρE))2 − [I(Y ;E)]2
=
∫
dy pY (y)
(
δTGEδ
)2 − (Tr[WΣWTGE ])2 , (H53)
due to (H48). To evaluate the first term, consider that∫
dy pY (y)
(
δTGEδ
)2
=
∫
dy pY (y)
(
yTc W
TGEWyc
)2
. (H54)
Then write the above as∫
dy pY (y)
∑
ijk`
yic
[
WTGEW
]
ij
yjcy
k
c
[
WTGEW
]
k`
y`c
=
∑
ijk`
[
WTGEW
]
ij
[
WTGEW
]
k`
∫
dy pY (y)y
i
cy
j
cy
k
c y
`
c
(H55)
=
∑
ijk`
[
WTGEW
]
ij
[
WTGEW
]
k`
×
[
ΣijΣk` + ΣikΣj` + Σi`Σjk
]
(H56)
=
(
Tr[WTGEWΣ]
)2
+ 2 Tr[
(
WTGEWΣ
)2
] (H57)
=
(
Tr[WΣWTGE ]
)2
+ 2 Tr[
(
WΣWTGE
)2
], (H58)
where we applied Isserlis’ theorem [Iss18] to evaluate the
fourth moment and we employed the facts that WTGEW
and Σ are symmetric matrices. So then by combining
with (H53), we find that∫
dy pY (y) (D(ρ
y
E‖ρE))2 − [I(Y ;E)]2
=
1
2 ln2 2
Tr[
(
WΣWTGE
)2
]. (H59)
It remains to evaluate the term∫
dy pY (y)V (ρ
y
E‖ρE)
=
∫
dy
pY (y)
8 ln2 2
[
Tr[(∆V )
2
] + Tr[(∆Ω)
2
] + 4δTGEV GEδ
]
(H60)
=
1
8 ln2 2
[
Tr[(∆V )
2
] + Tr[(∆Ω)
2
]
]
+
1
2 ln2 2
∫
dy pY (y)δ
TGEV GEδ, (H61)
where we applied the formula in (H12). Then it follows
that∫
dy pY (y)δ
TGEV GEδ
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr[δδ
TGEV GE ] (H62)
=
∫
dy pY (y) Tr[W (y − µ) (y − µ)T WTGEV GE ]
(H63)
= Tr[WΣWTGEV GE ]. (H64)
Putting everything together, we find that
V (Y ;E) =
1
8 ln2 2
[
Tr[(∆V )
2
] + Tr[(∆Ω)
2
]
]
+
1
2 ln2 2
[
Tr[WΣWTGEV GE ] + Tr[
(
WΣWTGE
)2
]
]
,
(H65)
as claimed.
The formulas from Proposition 2 can be applied to the
scenario in which some modes of a Gaussian state are
measured according to a “general-dyne” Gaussian mea-
surement [GLS16, Ser17], which leaves a Gaussian en-
semble of Gaussian states on the remaining modes. To
see how this works, let ρAB denote a bipartite Gaussian
state of m + n modes, with m modes for system A and
n modes for system B. Suppose that the 2 (m+ n) × 1
mean vector of ρAB is [
rA
rB
]
, (H66)
and the 2 (m+ n)×2 (m+ n) quantum covariance matrix
is [
VA VAB
V TAB VB
]
. (H67)
A general-dyne measurement of system B is described by
a quantum Gaussian state ωM with covariance matrix
VM satisfying the uncertainty principle VM + iΩ ≥ 0
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[GLS16, Ser17]. The POVM elements of this general-
dyne detection are given by{
1
(2pi)
n Dˆ−yωM Dˆy
}
y∈R2n
, (H68)
where the displacement operator is defined as Dˆy :=
exp(iyTΩrˆ), and the following completeness relation
holds
1
(2pi)
n
∫
R2n
dy Dˆ−yωM Dˆy. (H69)
(Note that ideal heterodyne detection corresponds to
VM = I2n.) If this measurement is performed on sys-
tem B of the state ρAB as specified above, then the in-
duced ensemble on system A is {pY (y), ρyA}, where
pY (y) =
exp
(
− 12 (y − rB)T
(
VB+VM
2
)−1
(y − rB)
)
√
(2pi)
2n
det
(
VB+VM
2
) ,
(H70)
and ρyA is a quantum Gaussian state with mean vector
rA + VAB (VB + VM )
−1
(y − rB) , (H71)
and quantum covariance matrix
VA − VAB (VB + VM )−1 V TAB . (H72)
Thus, we can use Proposition 2 to calculate both the
Holevo information and the Holevo information variance
of this ensemble with the following identifications in Def-
inition 1:
µ = rB , (H73)
Σ =
VB + VM
2
, (H74)
W = VAB (VB + VM )
−1
, (H75)
ν = rA − VAB (VB + VM )−1 rB , (H76)
V = VA − VAB (VB + VM )−1 V TAB . (H77)
